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ABSTRACT
Paradigmatic Recrudescence: Classical Realism in the Age of Globalization
by
Nerses Kopalyan
Dr. Jonathan R. Strand, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The paradigm of classical realism has been the subject of extensive debate in the study of
international relations. Its axiomatic suppositions, conceptual structures, theoretical
framework, and analytical scope have made realism the subject of both genuine
veneration and intense scrutiny at the hands of international relations scholars. This has
had a three-fold effect on the evolvement of the paradigm: realism has been methodically
revised by neorealists; realism has become a tool of analysis for revisionist non-realists;
and realism has been marginalized and erroneously critiqued. The objective of this thesis
is to demonstrate and prove the following four points. First, to address the problem of
revisionism and the marginalization of classical realism, arguing for the revival of the
paradigm. Second, to introduce an original method of inquiry, via the dialectical, to the
study of the realist paradigm, providing for a new analytical approach. Third, to
demonstrate, contrary to much held criticism, that the realist paradigm is both adequate
and progressive within the standards of philosophy of science. And fourth, to address the
concerns of whether the explanatory powers of the paradigm are sufficient in addressing
the anomalies of the modern international political system. In its entirety, this thesis
demonstrates that classical realism is a complete paradigm, providing the discipline with
the most comprehensive tools in addressing the age of globalization.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The paradigm of classical realism,1 as a research program that seeks to understand
and explain the nature of international politics, has been the subject of extensive debate in
the study of international relations (IR). The composition of realism, with its axiomatic
suppositions, conceptual structures, and analytical depth, has made this theory the subject
of both genuine veneration and intense scrutiny at the hands of international relations
scholars. The principles of the discipline often make realist assumptions about the nature
of international politics appear to be truisms. Because of this, realism has been the subject
of extensive usage by various schools of thought within IR. This appeal to realism,
however, has had a three-fold effect with respect to the evolvement of realism. First,
realism has been the subject of methodical revisionism2 at the hands of neorealists.
Second, realism has become a tool of analysis for revisionist non-realists who have
sought to use the richness of realism to bolster their own theories. And third, neorealism
and other minimalist realist approaches have been incorrectly classified as extensions of
the realist paradigm, where all forms of criticism leveled against the neo-paradigms have
been erroneously deemed critiques of realism itself. Whatever the case might be,

1

“Classical realism” will be used interchangeably with the term “realism” to refer to Hans J. Morgenthau’s
political theory. While E.H. Carr is also deemed as one of the founders of classical realism, this paper will
primarily concentrate on the theoretical structure of Morgenthau, since much of international relations
scholarship has placed far more emphasis on Morgenthau than any other realist thinker. While we closely
associate Morgenthau with classical realism, we refrain from extending this method of analysis to any other
scholar (with the exception of Kenneth Waltz with neorealism and Robert O.Keohane with neoliberalism),
thus bypassing the very complex and controversial process of identifying certain scholars with certain
paradigms, where such certainty is both unclear and debatable.
2
The term revisionism is used in this thesis within the context of defining and exposing the methodical
alteration, modification and restructuring of a given paradigm’s theoretical structure, conceptual models,
and fundamental assumptions. A scholar or a school of thought is deemed revisionist when it engages in an
act of revisionism, as specified above, and where which such revisionism contradicts the theoretical
framework and fundamental assumptions of the given paradigm. Epistemologically, therefore, revisionism
as contradiction is a form of paradigm-building that is structurally unjustifiable.
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contemporary scholars have remolded and restructured the paradigm for the sake of
formulating their own theories. The dire need of such scholars to resort to revisionism in
their approaches to realism suggests that they presuppose an underlying deficiency within
realism itself.
While it is not the intent of this thesis to rescue realism from revisionism, it is,
however, to expose how revisionism has taken place, the rationale that claims to justifies
revisionism, and the inherent inconsistencies that are prevalent between the revisionist
justifications and the overall theoretical framework of classical realism. Thus, the first
part of this thesis seeks to expose the misuse of realism at the hands of contemporary
revisionist scholars, address in a comparative fashion the theoretical foundations of the
revisionist schools of thought, and provide a counter-argument in defense of the
presumed insufficiencies that are inherent in classical realism.
Since realism has been the subject of extensive use by the various theoretical schools
of thought within IR, this thesis can not address the revisionism undertaken by all. It will,
however, address the two main schools of thought that have revised realism more
extensively than any of the other schools of thought within the discipline: neorealism and
neoliberalism. Neorealism, as the self-proclaimed savior of the paradigm, has adapted
structuralism in its attempt to contribute to the advancement of classical realism. In its
attempt to account for the “deficiencies” of realism, neorealism has negated the atomistic
nature of realism in favor of a positional analysis, has rejected the emphasis on
optimization of power in favor of distributive assessments, and has disregarded the
important components of diplomacy and rational stratagem as reductionist in favor of
systemic determinism. In essence, the presuppositions of realism have been revised and
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altered to make realism compatible with systemic structuralism. Therefore, this thesis
shall demonstrate the incompatibility of realism with structuralism by demonstrating the
fundamental principles of classical realism, its negation of revisionism, and how it
accounts for the so-called insufficiencies and deficiencies that the discipline presumably
suffers from.
Neoliberalism, on the other hand, has approached classical realism in a purely
instrumental sense: to use the important components of realism to augment liberal
institutionalism, and then completely disregard realism in favor of institutionalism. Thus,
while neorealism derives in part from realism, albeit perhaps inconsistently,
neoliberalism only views realism as a theoretical framework that should be used for the
benefit of its own theory and then to be caste aside. While neorealism commits more acts
of revisionism, neoliberalism, however, provides far more instances of analytical and
theoretical inconsistencies. Shifts from state-centrism to limitation of the state by
institutions, from rational and egoist assumptions to bounded-rationality and empathy
contentions, and from marginalization of security concerns to concentration on
institutionalized economic cooperation are but a few examples that demonstrate the
incompatibility of neoliberal revisionism. In sum, the initial argument of this project
holds that the revisionism committed by neorealism and neoliberalism is incompatible
with realism, does not provide for the so-called deficiencies within realism, and
establishes neorealism and neoliberalism on theoretically inconsistent and contradictory
foundations. Consequently, two important approaches are taken: 1) a solution is provided
to these exposed problems, while accounting for the so-called deficiencies that
neorealism and neoliberalism have claimed to satisfy; and 2) this thesis will compare and
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contrast the two paradigms that have sought to revise realism, while providing an original
theoretical argument that is consistent with realism, accounts for institutionalism, and
negates the concerns of neorealism. Note, the ongoing neoliberal-neorealist debate is not
crucial to the underlying argument of this paper, but merely serves as a mechanism by
which the reintroduction of classical realism, as a more useful paradigm, is introduced in
relation to the two revisionist paradigms. Neoliberalism and neorealism, in and of
themselves, are not crucial to the analytical and structural model of this project’s
assessment of classical realism. The revisionist paradigms, however, are incorporated
into the discourse for three primary reasons: 1) to demonstrate to the reader how classical
realism has been treated in modern scholarship; 2) to engage and counter criticisms of
classical realism, while demonstrating the superiority of the paradigm; and 3) to justify
the necessity of reviving classical realism.
This initial introductory chapter provides a general introduction to the overarching
structure of this thesis, with a tour of the extant discourse of classical realism, the
neorealist-neoliberal debate with respect to each paradigm’s claim of ascendancy, and the
nature of the revisionism that classical realism has been subjected to. Chapter 2 is
introduced with a literature review that explores the current discourse pertaining to the
very issues discussed in the introduction. The structuration of the paradigm’s
epistemological framework is also introduced in this chapter, along with an assessment of
the fundamental assumptions that define the paradigm. Paradigm-building, as a theory
oriented approach, is explored in this chapter, providing for a penetrating look at the
guidelines of theory articulation within the paradigm. Chapter 2 then proceeds to explore
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the conceptual, structural, and analytical framework of classical realism, providing an
assessment of all the important components of the paradigm’s theoretical model.
In chapter 3, an analysis of the fundamental principles of classical realism is
presented in conjunction and in comparison to the revisionism undertaken by both
neoliberalism and neorealism, demonstrating that the presumed deficiencies within
classical realism (as claimed by the two neo-paradigms) are in fact distortions or
misinterpretations of realism. The problem of revisionism becomes a critical issue of
discussion because it illuminates the rationale for the negation or marginalization of the
paradigm. Thus, by exposing and countering the claims of the revisionist scholars, it
becomes possible to provide the theoretical and epistemological justifications for the
revival of classical realism as a progressive paradigm.
Chapter four addresses the most important theoretical concept within classical
realism, and the one that is perhaps the most controversial: realism’s fundamental
assumption that interest defined in terms of power is the underlying force in international
politics. That is, does power, as defined within the interests and actions of the rational
state-actor, explain the nature of modern international relations? While in chapter two the
concept of power is addressed normatively and historically, it is not addressed within the
context of modernity. Modernity requires its own separate structure of justification vis-àvis the vast difference between the international political system of the past and the
present. The theoretical-analytical model that provides an answer to the concerns of
modernity is the dialectical model presented in this chapter. Hegelian in structure and
Clausewitzian in context, this proposed model addresses accountability, consistency, and
the explanatory powers of classical realism as it takes on the challenges of modernity.

5

More specifically, it provides an original and in-depth assessment of the paradigm’s
underlying structuration, in which the formulation of several of the paradigm’s
fundamental assumptions are demonstrated, along with the intrinsic and intricate nature
of how these fundamental assumptions are intertwined and developed within the
dialectical process.
Chapter five addresses one of the most devastating critiques leveled against the realist
paradigm, that realism is a degenerative paradigm by virtue of its regressive scientific
approach. Using Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science, John A. Vasquez offers a
powerful argument that the realist paradigm has failed to lead scientific inquiry and
knowledge accumulation within the field of international relations. Vasquez seeks to
demonstrate that the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm lack explanatory and
predictive power and are thus falsified, leading to his conclusion that realism, as the most
dominant paradigm in the post-WWII era, is degenerative. Concomitantly, this thesis
takes issue with Vasquez’s eloquent critique, demonstrating the theoretical and analytical
flaws in Vasquez’s assessment of realism, and arguing that Vasquez’s misreading of the
paradigm’s fundamental principles is the underlying reason for his conclusions. As such,
Vasquez’s entire approach is deconstructed and scrutinized to demonstrate that the realist
paradigm, contrary to Vasquez’s evaluation, meets the criteria of a progressive paradigm
In conclusion, the sixth chapter will address the fundamental question of whether
classical realism is in fact compatible with modernity. More specifically, is realism a
progressive paradigm? It does so by asking whether the fundamental assumptions and the
theoretical framework of the paradigm, as demonstrated and interpreted in this thesis, are
outdated assessments that still clinch to the power politics of the past; or are they
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dynamic paradigm-guided assumptions whose explanatory capacity in dealing with the
reality of international politics make realism an important tool in studying the
international system of the modern age?

7

CHAPTER 2
MORGENTHAU’S CLASSICAL REALISM: THE GODFATHER OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Revisionism is analytically problematic and theoretically subjective. The negations of
being accused of revisionism are embedded in its complexity, its exposure concealed in
the pluralistic nature of analysis, and its subjective justification. Classical realism’s
rudimentary elements have been synthesized, altered, manipulated, and distorted all
under the banner of making classical realism escape its status as an inadequate and
insufficient theory. As a result of such revisionism, and the complex features of
revisionism itself, very few scholars have undertaken the burden of addressing this
phenomenon and exposing revisionism for what it is: instrumentalism that has distorted
and manipulated classical realism’s analytical-theoretical structure to formulate new
research programs. This section will provide a close reading of Morgenthau’s classical
realism, assessing its fundamental assumptions, theoretical presuppositions, and
discussing such imperative concepts as power, balance-of-power, morality, and
international peace. This will demonstrate that such concepts have been disregarded or
altered by revisionist scholars in their misunderstandings of classical realism, leading to a
falsification of the claims proposed by such critics that classical realism is either
inadequate or insufficient as a paradigm to deal with the complexities of contemporary
international politics. But first, a schematic literature review.
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A Literature Review
Since its introduction into the study of international relations in the early 1950’s,
realism has become perhaps the most dominant paradigm in the discipline, displaying a
“staying power” that has been appreciated by both academicians and practitioners of
politics alike.3 Steven Forde confirms this widely held argument by maintaining that
“[r]ealism of one variety or another has dominated the study of international relations for
the past fifty years.”4 Keith L. Shimko demonstrates that the dominance of realism
became embedded in the academia of post-WWII society after “liberal idealism and its
attendant utopianism were discredited” in mainstream scholarship.5 Since the American
intellectual heritage lacked a genuine conservative tradition, the failure of its liberal
idealism paved the way for realism, as a European intellectual movement, to find a
prominent niche in the study of international relations in America. Robert Cox holds that
it was “European-formed thinkers like…Hans Morgenthau who introduced a more
pessimistic and power-oriented view of mankind into the American milieu conditioned
by eighteenth-century optimism and nineteenth century belief in progress.”6 While
political realism is generally traced all the way to ancient Greece, especially in the works
of Thucydides, its introduction as a scientifically oriented discipline was facilitated by
Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr. However, while Carr placed extensive emphasis on the
“scientific character of the enterprise,” Morgenthau sought more of a middle ground

3

Robert L. Rothstein, “On the Costs of Realism,” Political Science Quarterly Vol. 87, No. 3 (September
1972), pp. 347-362.
4
Steven Forde, “International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and
Neorealism,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 1995), pp. 141-160.
5
Keith L. Shimko, “Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism,” The Review of Politics Vol. 54, No.
2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 281-301.
6
Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States, and World Orders,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O.
Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 240-241.
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approach, seeking to find a balance between leading the scientific revolution headed by
realism and preserving its normative essence.7
While extensive attention has been given to Morgenthau’s realism as regarding power
and irredentism, more contemporary scholars have emphasized and sought to
demonstrate the vital role that elements of morality and ethics play in the principles of
realism. A.J.H. Murray insists that in contrast to “traditional interpretations,” classical
realism is primarily hinged on the normative tradition, and “in contrast to revisionist
accounts,” Morgenthau’s moral theory “is rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition of moral
thought.”8 Other scholars, concentrating on realism’s power politics, have rejected this
premise, holding that the underlying assumptions of realism make its appeal to morality
ultimately inadequate and problematic.9 Bahman Fozouni provides special attention to
such inadequacies, maintaining that the shortcomings of classical realism are embedded
in its epistemological underpinnings. This, however, is the byproduct of the “exceptional
parsimony of realism’s theoretical structure and the nomothetic nature of its claim.”10
Criticisms of inadequacy, amorality, theoretical insufficiency, limited scientific
methodology, and accusation of realism as a “degenerative” paradigm gave birth to the
rise of neorealism as the self-proclaimed heir of classical realism, while also paving the
way for the introduction of neoliberalism as a paradigm that fuses classical realism with

7

For a discussion of E.H. Carr and his perspective on the scientific role of Realism, see The Twenty Years’
Crisis, 1919-1939, (London: MacMillan, 1940), pg. 8-10. For Morgenthau’s skepticism toward the over
usage of science in the study of international politics, see Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1946).
8
A.J.H. Murray, “The Moral Politics of Hans Morgenthau,” The Review of Politics Vol. 58, No. 1 (Winter
1996), pp. 81-107. For a discussion of Morgenthau’s moral realism, see Christoph Frei, Hans J.
Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography, (Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Press, 2001).
9
For a discussion of the incompatibility of morality with Morgenthau’s theory, see Martin Grifith, Realism,
Idealism, and International Politics, (London: Routledge, 1992) pp. 71-76. For an assessment of the
inadequacy of morality in realism, see Michael Smith, Realist Thought From Weber to Kissinger, (Baton
Roughe, LA: LSU Press, 1986), pp 139-146, 234-241.
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classical idealism/liberalism.11 Yet regardless of one’s position on classical realism,
“[f]ew would dispute the claim that the theory of political realism, especially as
articulated by Hans J. Morgenthau nearly half a century ago, has been the nearest
approximation to a reigning paradigm or, at least, a dominant orthodoxy in the field of
international politics.”12 This same position is also held by Mansbach and Vasquez,
where they maintain that the sustainable dominance of classical realism in the study of
international relations is unquestionable.13 In a similar fashion, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff
have also conceded that classical realism, as articulated by Morgenthau, has displayed an
unmatched staying power in the study of international relations.14
The introduction of structuralism and the subsequent renaissance of institutionalism
in international relations scholarship—as tacit reactions to classical realism—made
neorealism and neoliberalism “two of the most influential contemporary approaches to
international relations theory.”15 Much of the neorealist-neoliberal debate can bee seen
as a reaction to the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics. 16
This reaction came in the form of Robert Keohane’s neoliberalism, which sought to

10

Bahman Fozouni, “Confutation of Political Realism,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4
(December, 1995), pp. 479-510.
11
For a discussion of realism as an inadequate paradigm, see John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power
Politics: A Critique, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1982). For a critique of Neorealism’s
claim as the heir of classical realism, see Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International
Organization Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 225-286.
12
Fozouni, “Confutation of Political Realism,” pg. 479.
13
R.W. Mansbach and J.A. Vasquez, In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pg. xiii.
14
J.A. Dougherty and R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive
Survey, (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), pg. 81.
15
Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate,”
International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994) pp. 313-344.
16
For a discussion of the overall theoretical structure of neorealism, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of
International Politics, (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For a look at Waltz’ initial works,
especially his assessment of classical realism and an introduction of some of neorealism’s most important
principles, see Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University Press,
2001). For a general discussion by Waltz of these two books and their vital importance to the neorealist-
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synthesize elements of classical realism with liberal institutionalism, with extensive
emphasis on the world political economy.17 While both paradigms concede that the
foundations of their philosophical, theoretical, and conceptual structures are greatly
hinged on classical realism, both claim to have surpassed classical realism in depth,
progressiveness, and more importantly, in explanatory capacity. The neorealist-neoliberal
debate has sidelined the relevance of classical realism in contemporary discourse, with
much of the debate revolving around one paradigm seeking to falsify the other, while
downplaying the extensive level of revisionism undertaken by both.
Neorealists such as John J. Mearsheimer agree that “institutionalist theory is largely a
response to [neo]realism” and it “challenges [neo]realism’s underlying logic.”18
Neorealists fault neoliberals for their extensive attention to institutionalism at the expense
of security, for neorealism argues “that international institutions are unable to mitigate
anarchy’s constraining effects on inter-state cooperation.”19 This is complemented by
neorealism’s innate pessimism toward the prospects of international cooperation and the
capacity of international institutions to facilitate such.20 John G. Ruggie, among many
other scholars, rejects the anti-institutionalism argument presented by the neorealist
camp, demonstrating that international institutions and institutional restraint have
facilitated continued international cooperation within contemporary international

neoliberal debate, see “Reflections on Theory of International Politics,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed.
Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 322-345.
17
See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation in the World Political Economy, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2005).
18
John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19,
No. 3 (Winter 1994), pp. 5-49.
19
Joseph M. Greico, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionalism,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 485-507.
20
For a discussion of classical realism’s pessimism toward cooperation, see Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs.
Power Politics, pp. 187-199. For a neorealist interpretation of realism’s pessimistic analysis, see Robert
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politics.21 The debate between these two approaches has dominated international relations
scholarship for the last two decades, contributing to the development and intellectual
heritage of the discipline.22 Regardless of the suggested differences between the
approaches, however, it is not that difficult for observes to detect how the two theories
overlap in many ways, suggesting some common roots in classical realism, and their
common revisionism of Morgenthau’s political theory. To this end, the next section
introduces the political theory of classical realism.

Realism’s Epistemology: The Underlying Theoretical-Philosophic Structure
Realism, at its most basic level, involves commitment to a set of propositions
concerning the nature of international politics that are essentially extrapolated from the
diplomatic history of Europe following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. These
propositions are articulated in the form of a theory, and the formulation of such a theory
that defines classical realism is the one provided by Hans J. Morgenthau. For
Morgenthau, a theory of international relations is in essence a theory of international
politics, for as a totality of complex social phenomena, international relations, similar to
domestic relations, necessitates the capacity of international politics to take precedence
over other perspectives and become the focus of any theoretical approach to international

Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O.
Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) pg. 304.
21
John G. Ruggie, “The False Promise of Realism,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995)
pp. 62-70.
22
For further discussions of the neorealist-neoliberal debate, see John J. Mearshiemer, “A Realist Reply,”
International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995) pp. 82-97; see also David A. Baldwin, ed.
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993);
for a neoliberal response to the ongoing debate, see Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise
of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995) pp. 39-51; see also
Robert Axelord and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and
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relations: “[t]he primacy of politics over all other interests, in fact as well as in thought, is
so far as the relations among nations and areas are concerned, needs only to be mentioned
to be recognized.”23 Since the nature of politics is embedded in the struggle for power,
this premise of uniformity holds true for both international and domestic politics, leading
to Morgenthau’s conclusion that a general political theory inevitably confronts a theory
of international politics.24 Yet Morgenthau does not suggest that domestic and
international politics are intertwined to such an extent that the distinction is blurred, but
rather he argues that the environment within which international politics takes place is
quite different from the environment of domestic politics, “[w]hat sets international
society apart from other societies is the fact that its strength—political, moral, social—is
concentrated in its members, its own weakness being the reflection of that strength.”25
Morgenthau contends that theory must serve as a tool of understanding, a mechanism
that facilitates the objective of bringing order and meaning into a “mass of unconnected
material.”26 Its primary purpose is to reduce the facts of experience to specific instances
of general propositions, yet it should not be forgotten that this reduction automatically
transcends the specific facts of experience into an intellectually abstract realm. Thus, the
general propositions formulated by theory should not be employed as “blueprint for
political action.”27 Theory, because of its abstract nature, is limited by the very nature of

Institutions,” Kenneth Oye, ed. Cooperation Under Anarchy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986),
pp. 219-232.
23
Hans J.Morgenthau, The Decline of Democratic Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)
pg. 125.
24
Ibid., pg. 77.
25
Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations,” in William T.R.
Fox, ed. Theoretical Aspects of International Relations, (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959)
pg. 23.
26
Morgenthau, The Decline of Democratic Politics, pg. 72.
27
Hans J. Morgenthau, The Restoration of American Politics, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962)
pg. 1.

14

politics itself, where contingent and unpredictable elements obviate the possibility of
definitive theoretical understanding. It is precisely at this point where Morgenthau’s
realism defines itself as a realism of both theory and politics, where the abstract is
negated in favor of the practical. In short, pragmatic assessments of the empirical world
are more important than the systematized abstractions of that empirical world.
Morgenthau’s appeal to the traditional continental conservatism of Edmund Burke,
which rejects theory in favor of practical politics, defines the philosophical-theoretical
structure of classical realism.28 It is for this reason that Morgenthau attacks theoretical
endeavors that seek “to reduce international relations to a system of abstract propositions
with a predictive function.”29 It is classical realism’s negation of this specific premise
(which lies at the very heart of its theoretical-philosophical structure) that has been
ignored and manipulated by revisionist paradigms that appeal to classical realism as a
source of self-legitimization. Thus, the very insertion of structuralism, for example, is a
mechanism of systematization that seeks to serve an explanatory and predictive purpose.
While elements of realism can comfortably be remolded into a structural framework, this
very process of synthesis is antithetical to the philosophical-theoretical principles of
classical realism. Furthermore, Morgenthau’s appeal to a practical, and pragmatic
assessment of international politics makes classical realism compatible with the constant
changing nature of international politics, for the essence of realism is to observe and
practically deal with such flux, not to enmesh itself into its own theoretical abstractions
as a methodological approach to understanding the phenomena of international politics,
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for realism “appeals to historic precedent rather than to abstract principles.”30 For this
reason, only by observing Morgenthau’s conception of what theory is, and how his
conception of theory shapes the theory of realism itself, can we better understand the
nature of the revisionism that has taken place against realism.

Classical Realism as a Theory of International Relations: Its Principles, Concepts, and
Analytical Framework
Having developed a conceptual understanding of classical realism’s philosophicaltheoretical structure, we now turn our attention to an assessment of what classical realism
is as a theory of international relations. Realism is the political philosophy of
Morgenthau, yet Morgenthau is quite aware of the fact that as a term, realism is both
ambiguous and not self-explanatory. Thus, Morgenthau places emphasis on the concept
of actuality, an assessment of that which exists, rather than that which could, or which is
presumed to exist, that is, the phenomena in question are actual phenomena, not
hypothetical, or theoretically abstract. Hence Morgenthau’s definition of the theory of
realism: “[t]he theoretical concern with human nature as it actually is, and with the
historic process as they actually take place, has earned for the theory presented here the
name of realism.”31 Realism is concerned not with a theory’s conception of what the
world is or should be, but rather what the empirical world actually is. Therefore, reality,
for realism, takes precedence over theory, and theory only serves reality as its servant, for
it is reality that shapes the theory of realism, not the theoretical concepts that are born out
of the theory itself. For this reason, realism is a broad and dynamic paradigm within IR,
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for its explanatory powers and auxiliary assumptions account for the realities of the
world, rather than seeking to shift or manipulate such realities to fit into its own theory.
As a result of such scope and depth, the accusations of inadequacy or insufficiency
leveled against realism are themselves inadequate and insufficient, for realism is not a
static theory—it deals with historic processes, that is, the constant change and
evolvement of the world—and is thus capable of providing adequate and sufficient
assessments of the ever-changing realities of the world. In essence, contentions of
inadequacy or insufficiency suggest a theory’s inability to account for or deal with novel
phenomena within the realities of world politics. However, the very essence of realism is
precisely to account for and address actual phenomena. Therefore, realism cannot be
deficient as its very purpose is to decide and understand the actual historic processes
taking place. In this sense, any contemporary phenomenon that come into existence are
phenomena that realism can address, for its is not restricted by any theoretical
assumptions, since its main theoretical assumption is just that, to deal with the actualities
of the world, regardless of how dynamic, unique, or unusual it may be.32 Thus, realism,
for example, can explain globalization, institutionalism, integration, and other
phenomena that are taking place in the world. More deductive paradigms may be prone to
refuse to accept the actual realities of the world because of the narrowness of their
research programs. That is, realism would not and cannot reject any actual phenomena
regardless of its theoretical presuppositions, for the very purpose of its theoretical
presuppositions is precisely to do that, to account for phenomena that reality presents. In
sum, while certain theories approach the realities of the world through the myopic lenses
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of their paradigms, classical realism does just the opposite, it approaches the world as it
is, not what a paradigm’s theoretical presuppositions assume it to be.
To provide a more thorough understanding of realism, Morgenthau provides an
outline of the six principles—which form a large part of the paradigm’s fundamental
assumptions—that are the core and essence of realism’s political philosophy. The first
principle maintains that politics is “governed by objective laws that have their roots in
human nature.”33 The capacity to improve society is embedded in understanding these
laws, and realism aspires to formulate a rational theory that “reflects” these objective
laws. These laws, in essence, are what define the known world to us, for their existence is
an extension of human nature, and both are fixed and innate.34 The static nature of these
objective laws of politics (static in this sense refers to longevity, that they have existed as
such throughout history, but their static nature is not absolute) suggests a capacity to
transcend time, and such longevity and endurance suggests a unique capacity within a
theory that articulates such laws. Morgenthau specifically concentrates on this point, “the
fact that a theory of politics was developed hundreds or even thousands of years ago—as
was the theory of the balance of power—does not create a presumption that it must be
outmoded and obsolete.”35 The wealth of history, Morgenthau suggests, provides
legitimacy to a theory that has endured and observed the persistent complexities of
human interactions, for a theory of politics “must be subjected to the dual test of reason
and experience.” This incrementally developing conception of a theory’s legitimacy visà-vis its historical endurance provides a strong rebuttal against contemporary revisionists
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and critics who have accused realism of the very same contentions that Morgenthau
himself foresaw fifty years before:
To dismiss such a theory because it had its flowering in
centuries past is to present not a rational argument but a
modernistic prejudice that takes for granted the superiority
of the present over the past. To dispose of the revival of such
a theory as a “fashion” or “fad” is tantamount to assuming
that in matters political we can have opinions but no truths.36
In this first principle, Morgenthau provides an argument against potential claims of static
ahistoricism, for he clearly separates the static nature of objective laws from the historical
processes such laws transcend. Any claims by critics or revisionists that fail to observe
this underlying premise of separation are mere “opinions but no truths.” In sum, the first
principle accomplishes two objectives: it lends authoritative legitimacy to a theory that
has endured throughout history and it separates the static nature of this endurance from its
historic process, refuting accusations of ahistoricism.
The second principle introduces one of the most vital concepts in the political
philosophy of realism: the concept of interest defined in terms of power.37 Thus, realism
assumes that political actors behave and think in terms of interest defined as power. This
concern with interest and power leads realism to eschew any preoccupation with the
ideological preferences of political actors. Political actors engage in the process of
expanding the rational interests of the state, and since such interest is defined in terms of
power, political actors are in essence seeking to expand the power of the state. This
mechanism of expansion is the state’s foreign policy, and only a rational foreign policy is
a good policy, “for only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits
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and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political
requirement of success.”38 By defining what rational foreign policy should be, realism
becomes capable of countering critics and revisionists who have offered a potentially
devastating attack against realism: realism’s notion of national interest is extremely broad
and ambiguous, and any activity undertaken by the state is deemed rational and in its selfinterest regardless of outcome, leading to the conclusion that the state cannot be irrational
or act against its self-interest. This widely held claim is directly falsified by
Morgenthau’s definition, for if a state’s actions do not “maximize benefits” and
“minimize risks” through prudent decision-making, its lack of political success would
cause the state’s actions to be both irrational and not in its self-interests. To this end,
claims of ambiguity, with respect to national interest, and relativity, with respect to
rationality, are not legitimate grounds of criticism of classical realism.
It is the concept of power, Morgenthau maintains, that distinguishes the study of
political facts from the study of nonpolitical facts, that is, “[w]ithout such a concept a
theory of politics, international or domestic, would altogether be impossible.”39 Realism’s
specification that interest defined as power applies primarily to the political realm is
complemented by Morgenthau’s claim that it also separates politics from “economics,
ethics, aesthetics, or religion.” Therefore, propositions, for example, that claim the realist
conception of power to be inadequate or inapplicable in dealing with economic factors
become propositions that are inherently flawed, for the concept of interest defined as
power is only applied to the political domain. Thus, when the economic realm becomes
the subject of study, realism does not and cannot insist that the concept of power should
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be the dominant or the primary tool of analysis, but rather “interest defined as wealth”
becomes the conceptual tool of analysis. Such a confusion of the functional role of a
concept within a theory is a problematic presupposition presented by the observer, not the
theory itself. To this end, the second principle solidifies the legitimacy of realism by
providing two levels of defense against critics and revisionists: 1) the national interest
and rationality problem as it pertains to the state is alleviated; and 2) the confusion or
misunderstanding over the concept of interest defined as power is remedied by
demonstrating its specific functional role within the paradigm.
The third principle addresses one of the most important and misunderstood premises
pertaining to the realist conception of interest defined as power: realism does not claim an
absolute and permanent meaning for its concept of power, but rather assumes the concept
as “an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept
with a meaning that is fixed once and for all.”40 While the idea of interests is indeed the
essence of politics and is “unaffected by the circumstances of time and place,” it,
however, is dependent upon the “political and cultural context,” that is, environment
plays a vital role in shaping the interests that determine and provide justification for
political action.41 This same fundamental premise also applies to the concept of power,
for its “content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural
environment.”42 More specifically, Morgenthau is not asserting that the concept of power
is used in an ad hoc fashion, but rather that power is not absolute, in that it is not “fixed
once and for all.” Thus, Morgenthau formulates an extremely important distinction
between interest and power, establishing a framework through which the capacity of
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power as the most dominant interest is inherently limited, for power is contingent upon
the environment and conditions that define and determine the state’s interests.
This distinction questions the widely held myth that realism is obsessed with power,
and that its political philosophy hinges all forms of analysis upon a power-based
framework. Realism does not approach historical and contemporary phenomena through
a power-based framework because of its theoretical presuppositions, but rather because
the historic process and the nature of contemporary international politics are assumed to
be defined by power. Thus, it is the nature and the role of power in international politics
that lead realism to place extensive emphasis upon it, not its innate philosophicaltheoretical structure. It is power, as an undeniable reality within international politics,
which accounts for realism’s subscription to the concept, and to this end, if power ceases
to serve as the dominant force in the reality of international politics, realism will, without
any reservations, limit its subscription to power. For this reason, the claims that realism is
a power obsessed paradigm are “mere opinions” that hold no analytic truth, for realism is
not power-centric, but rather interest-centric, and Morgenthau demonstrates this by
limiting the role of power as it relates to the realities of international relations:
When the times tend to depreciate the element of power, it
[political science] must stress its importance. When the times
incline toward a monistic conception of power in the general
scheme of things, it must show its limitations. When the times
conceive of power primarily in military terms, it must call
attention to the variety of factors which go into the power
question.43
The conceptual framework established by the third principle is problematic for critics
and revisionists for two primary reasons: 1) by demonstrating the non-static/dynamic
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nature of the concept of interest defined as power (that is, interest is defined as power
only to the extent that realities of the world continue to exist as such), and by separating
power and interest as two distinct elements, with the latter being the defining element of
realism, the third principle falsifies the claim that realism is a power-centric paradigm;
and 2) by demonstrating its awareness of the fact that power, as the defining interest, is
ephemeral in relation to the changing nature of the historic processes, realism reveals the
pragmatic, practical, and realistic nature of its paradigm, proving that it is not defined by
its theoretical presuppositions, but rather by an objective assessment of the empirical
world and the realities of international politics.
Principles four and five address realism’s approach to morality, and the role morality
plays, or should play, in international politics.44 Political realism, the fourth principle
holds, is not indifferent to morality, and is “aware of the moral significance of political
action.”45 However, realism is also aware of the “ineluctable tension” between morality
and successful politics, and this tension is born out of the dichotomous complexity
between individual/universal morality and state/political morality. That is, action
necessitated for the attainment of a certain moral goal is differentiated with respect to the
nature of the moral goal and the extent of the action that is necessitated. Thus,
individual/universal morality engulfs itself in some realm of abstract idealism, while
state/political morality is defined by its capacity to serve the interests of the state.
Therefore, the moral goal of the state might necessitate action that could be deemed
morally problematic on the individual/universal level. However, since the nature of the
state’s moral goal is different from that of the individual, the extent of the necessitated
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action is defined by its adherence to the ultimate moral goal of the state, the preservation
of its interests.46 Morgenthau further articulates this premise, “[r]ealism maintains that
universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract
universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances
of time and space.”47 For this reason, political morality is defined by prudence: the
necessity for extensive “consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral
action.” To this end, the morality of state action is defined by its political consequences.
After having distinguished and established a dichotomous relationship between
individual/universal morality and political/state morality, Morganthau writes of the fifth
principle, “[p]olitical realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular
nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.”48 In essence, while the existence of
universal morality is an undeniable truism, this truism ultimately fails to serve as the
guiding force behind the objectives of a given state, for the moral aspirations of a state, as
discussed, are quite different from universal morality. Political realism’s refusal to
identify state/political morality with universal morality is not merely based on
philosophical-theoretical grounds, but also, and perhaps primarily, on pragmatic grounds:
“[a]ll nations are tempted…to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the
moral purposes of the universe.”49 That is, the realities of the political world necessitate
states to define their interests in terms of power; however, to conceal and legitimize their
objectives, states tend to appeal to a universal morality.50 In more basic terms, principal
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five refuses to allow realism to become naïve, for naivety is antithetical to realism, since
it would blind the paradigm from the realities of international politics.
The fourth and fifth principles produce two distinct assumptions on morality that are
directly problematic for both neorealism and neoliberalism as revisionist paradigms.
First, principles four and five are directly tied with principle two, fusing the concept of
morality with the concept of rationality with respect to the concept of interest.
Specifically, since rational policy is good policy (second principle), that is, policy that
serves the interests of the state, and since serving the interest of the state is the moral goal
of state action (principles four and five), then any action that serves the interest of the
state is both rational and moral. This synthesis of the two concepts proves to be extremely
problematic for neorealism’s deterministic structuralism, for neorealism’s revisionist
premise negates the capacity of the agent to be responsible for consequences, since
consequences are determined by the structure. However, since the morality of the state is
defined by the consequences of the state’s actions, this negation of consequences
automatically negates the capacity for morality within neorealism, for it deems the
concept irrelevant. This hurls neorealism into the ethically problematic trap of being
amoral, while preserving classical realism’s claim as a paradigm that values morality.
Second, the distinction between universal and political morality is a proposition that
neoliberalism blatantly fails to observe, concentrating only on the former, while attaching
the concept of rational self-interest to the latter. Thus, neoliberalism falsely links
rationality with universal morality, instead of political/state morality, throwing itself into
the trap of naivety, that is, an inability to observe the state’s concealment of its true
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objectives. At the same time, if the actual, realistic state of the international political
system demonstrates international cooperation through which political/state morality is
being aligned with universal morality, then realism will be able to accept this, for it
accepts and holds universal morality in high regard. On the other hand, however, this
becomes extremely problematic for neorealism, undermining the very foundations of the
paradigm. In any instance, the flexible consistency of realism’s conception of morality
proves to be far more adequate and sufficient than that of its revisionist counterparts.
The sixth principle establishes the uniqueness of realism, in that realism is different
from “other schools of thought,” and this difference is both “real” and “profound,” for
realism constitutes a distinct intellectual approach. This approach is in sharp contrast with
other approaches to IR, for realism advocates the autonomy of politics vis-à-vis other
spheres of thought, that is, it “cannot but subordinate these other standards to those of
politics.”51 Morgenthau presents a distinct and powerful argument for purism as a method
of study for politics, that is, he rejects the infringement of other disciplines into the realm
of IR. This introduces realism’s negation of revisionism, that is, the interjection of
external schools of thought and the alteration of the existing conceptual framework of the
paradigm for the sake of accommodating such interjections. Morgenthau maintains that
realism “parts company with other schools when they impose standards of thought
appropriate to other spheres upon the political sphere.”52 This premise demonstrates
realism’s complete rejection of the revisionism undertaken by neorealism as the selfproclaimed saver of realism and neoliberalism as a subscriber to classical realism’s
fundamental presuppositions. By interjecting microeconomic principles and establishing
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sociological structuralism as the defining theoretical-conceptual framework of its
paradigm, neorealism commits a flagrant violation of this sixth principle, for it “imposes
standards of thought appropriate to other spheres,” such as economics and sociology,
“upon the political sphere.”53 This act of revisionism is antithetical to the entire
philosophic-theoretic structure of classical realism, completely negating and falsifying
neorealism’s claim as the heir to realism.
Neoliberalism also suffers a similar quandary; however, since it does not claim to be
an offshoot of classical realism, its revisionism is less problematic than that of
neorealism. Nonetheless, neoliberalism’s institutionalism, with its inherent roots in
classical idealism, proves to be both problematic and contradictory with its subscription
to the basic conceptions of classical realism. “The realist defense of the autonomy of the
political sphere against its subversion by other modes of thought does not imply disregard
for the existence and importance of these other modes of thought,” Morgenthau writes.
“It rather,” he continues, “implies that each should be assigned its proper sphere of
function.”54 The necessity to defend the “autonomy” of the original sphere becomes a
litmus test that neorealism completely fails through its acts of “subversion,” while
neoliberalism manages to preserve some degree of consistency, yet not to the extent of
remedying its own acts of revisionism. In sum, the sixth principle offers a decisive blow
against revisionism and becomes the fulcrum on which the theoretical justification of this
thesis hinges.
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The Concept of Power and the Theory of Balance of Power: Realism’s Homage to
Reality
Having assessed the theoretical, structural, and fundamental principles of classical
realism, this thesis now seeks to address the concept of power as a conceptual framework
that provides explanatory power to realism’s capacity to account for international
political phenomena. The social world, Morgenthau observes, is “but a projection of
human nature onto the collective plane,”55 a world of “unceasing struggle between good
and evil, reason and passion, life and death…peace and war—a struggle which so often
ends with the victory of the forces hostile to man.”56 It is a world of opposing interests,
driven by conflict and evil, with its roots in human nature, particularly two human traits:
selfishness and the lust for power. The former, however, has rational limits, for it has an
“objective relation to the vital needs of the individual” and “offers the best chances for
survival under the particular natural and social conditions under which the individual
lives.”57 Selfishness, in other words, serves an important purpose and can be satisfied,
and for this reason, it alone cannot explain the unending nature of conflict between man.
Thus, it is the latter that is the root of conflict and evil, for man’s desire for power is an
“all-permeating fact which is of the very essence of human existence,” one which has no
limits, and unlike selfishness, it cannot be appeased by concessions.58 The desire for
power, Morgenthau holds, “besides and beyond any particular selfishness or other
evilness of purpose, constitutes the ubiquity of evil in human action.”59
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In politics, the lust for power “is not merely blended with dominant aims of a
different kind but is the very essence of the intention, the very life-blood of the action,”
for “politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be,
power is its ultimate goal.”60 From this premise, Morgenthau defines power as “man’s
control over the minds and actions of other man,” one which “covers all social
relationships,” and systematically gives control to the dominant group over the dominated
group.61 In sum, political power is about control, not simple brute force, but rather the
ability of men to influence and have dominion over other men.62 This encompasses all
concepts of hegemony: ideological, cultural, social, economic, religious, etc. More
specifically, power in classical realism is to be understood as control over other actor(s),
control over the resources of these actor(s), and control over the events and outcomes that
are the byproduct of this continued control over the relationship by one actor over the
other(s). This plays an instrumental role in defending classical realism against much
criticism that views realism’s appeal to power only through a military, violence-oriented
lens. That is, while military capability is of extreme importance, realism does not view
dominance primarily through a military lens, and for this reason, such phenomena as
economic or ideological/cultural hegemony that could account for certain international
phenomena are not negated by classical realism, for classical realism transcends the
limited scope of military power and accounts for all forms of power. Thus, the essence of
realism’s appeal to political power is hinged upon the following premise: it is not the
nature or the form of power that is of essence, but rather the capacity of such power to
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establish control. Thus, realism, for example, would have no compunctions with the idea
of altering its power capabilities from a military-based conception of power to an
economic-based conception of power if the latter is more compatible with the actual
realities of international politics and could provide for more control than the former.
The classical realist conception of power presents two conceptual frameworks that are
extremely problematic for critics and revisionists. First, since the issue of power is
embedded in human nature, and not within the state itself, and since the state, or the
collection of humans, is the “projection of human nature,” realism perceives the state, as
an actor in power politics, to be the unit of analysis not because it presupposes the
givenness of the state, but rather the basic givenness of the human and the existence of
the state as an extension of human nature. Thus, realism escapes the problem of statism
and of the givenness of the state by presupposing the givenness of the obvious: man.63
Second, by defining power in terms of hegemony or control, and not mere military force,
realism escapes the problem of having to define the form of power in question,
consuming itself with only accounting for power that establishes control, regardless of
the form. This provides realism the theoretical elasticity necessary to account for any
international phenomena—ranging from economic to ideation factors—that deals with
control. To this end, this second framework allows realism to escape the much held
criticism that power is its Achilles heel, demonstrating that its primary task vis-à-vis
power is to account for control, regardless of the nature or the form of power that leads to
63
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the establishment of control. In retrospect, realism maintains that interest is the essence of
all politics. Therefore, it is only natural that on the international scene each state should
define and follow its national interest. Defined in terms of power, regardless of form,
interest defined in terms of gaining control becomes a truism that any state aspires to. By
bypassing the problem of having to define the form of power, realism escapes the
accusation that power is its Achilles heel and demonstrates that it possesses the adequate
tools to account for diverse and dynamic activities that dominate international politics.
Power, in realism, is counter-balanced by power, and while power is limited within
the domestic realm by a centralized authority, this, obviously, is not the case on the
international scene. Thus, the drive for power is potentially limitless. Realism accounts
for this problem at the structural level with its balance of power theory, which primarily
observes the state’s capacity for survival to be based on its ability to counter-balance the
power of another state. More specifically, to limit or prevent the control of another state
over one’s own sphere of influence, one must possess the capabilities of power that may
counter-balance the opposing state’s capacity for control. At the international level, this
creates a balancing game between the most powerful states, where a status quo provides
equilibrium to the international power structure, establishing the grounds for ephemeral
peace based on distribution of power. Thus, by carefully studying the distribution of
power, the capabilities of others, and optimizing one’s own powers, states engage in a
balancing act. The debate over the balance of power theory is quite vast, and space will
obviously not allow us to either tackle the concerns many critics have with the theory, nor
to assess the specific components of the theory. It will be noted, however, that this thesis
uses the concept of optimization of power to bypass the debate between
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maximization/absolute gain and relative gain that has dominated the discourse. A
frequent misconception of realism is to depict the struggle for power in terms of
maximization, with maximization being a product of the system, and power is maximized
without regard to environmental constraint. This assumption suggests a complete
misunderstanding of realism, for maximization inevitably promotes imperialism and
overextension, negating the most important concept to the balance of power theory: the
preservation of the status quo. Thus, imperialistic policy would account for all
international behavior, and the status quo policy would make no sense.64 Furthermore,
power is a relative concept, as Morgenthau has famously held, and maximization, without
observing environmental constraints, could lead to loss in relative position, rejecting the
existing balancing structure. Optimization, on the other hand, accounts for the relative
nature of power, optimizes power in relation to its environment, bypasses much of the
criticism falsely leveled against realism with respect to maximization, and provides a
more consistent approach to the relative gain premise: that relative gain, in itself, is not
sufficient, for a state must engage in relative optimization.
The primary concern in this section is to demonstrate that the principle of balance of
power is applicable to all international phenomena, for having specified in the previous
section realism’s conception of power, we bypass the much held misconception that
balance of power primarily pertains to balance of military power. While such has been
the case historically, this does not suggest that the theory is not flexible enough to
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account for international phenomena that are outside of the military realm. That is, since
power is defined in terms of control, and not necessarily military prowess, this allows the
balance of power theory to apply to all acts of balancing that pertain to control and
influence. Thus, the capacity of actor A to balance and limit actor B’s capacity for control
determines the status of actor A’s autonomy from actor B, and also actor A’s capacity to
control other actors. To presuppose that an actor willingly accepts being controlled is
defeatist and inherently problematic. When applied to any other realm within IR, for
example, this theory still holds: balance of power in economics (EU/US/Japan/China
relations), or balance of power in ideology/culture (Western democracies/Islamic
extremism relations). Each actor seeks to preserve its capacity for control by balancing
that of the other actor’s. Such is the balance of power theory, and it can account for
international behavior, regardless of the form of power or the nature of the phenomena.

Morality and International Peace: The “Softer” Side of Classical Realism
The claim that moral virtue is subordinate, or even antithetical, to the basic instincts
of human nature is an axiomatic presupposition that classical realism has had to deal with
in its attempt to address the realities of international politics, while at the same time
accounting for the necessary role of morality that international politics has historically
sidelined. In dealing with Morgenthau’s conception of morality, one encounters a twotier framework that has caused much misunderstanding and revision. The first framework
revolves around the practical or pragmatic-realistic approach to morality, that is, morality
is instrumental to classical realism in the tradition of the Hobbesian-Machiavellian
framework. As discussed previously, Morgenthau seeks to confront the “tension”
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between morality and politics, seeking a middle ground where the latter does not negate
the former, while at the same time the former is not made an instrument of the latter.65 It
is here we observe Morgenthau’s rejection of morality being used as an instrument of the
state, when he specifically cautions against the instrumental usage of morality, that is, the
“drive for power” being concealed under the banner of morality.66 In the first framework,
therefore, Morgenthau addresses the realistic and tense nature of morality in the political
realm, while negating the instrumental usage of morality through his demonstration of the
dichotomous relationship between universal and state morality.
Since realism refrains from rejecting universal morality in favor of state morality, but
rather concedes that the reality of international politics simply demands such a
categorization, realism introduces its second framework: the ontological relevance of
morality, within an Augustinian-Burkean framework, to the theoretical-philosophical
structure of realism.67 Morgenthau’s appeal to moral restraint within the international
realm—which discusses such factors as morality restraining states from engaging in
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assassinations, mass extermination and conquest, enslavement, etc.68—is empirical
testimony to the Augustinian-Burkean claim that morality should guide political action to
the extent that the realities of the political conditions allow. This reintroduces the much
discussed paradoxical situation between morality and political conditions, leading to
Morgenthau’s declaration, “the lust for power as ubiquitous empirical fact and its denial
as universal ethical norm are the poles between which this antinomy is suspended.”69
This dialectical process between the two poles of an antinomy forms the foundations of
realism’s attempt to accommodate the dilemma: the direct application of moral
imperatives to the political realm will yield disaster, while to altogether abandon the
moral imperatives will negate the very concept of morality. Morgenthau’s solution is an
appeal to the Augustinian-Burkean framework, “Both individual and state must judge
political action by universal moral principles,”70 that is, the “dialectic of ethics and
politics…prevents the latter, in spite of itself, from escaping the former’s judgment and
normative directions.”71 Building upon this dialectical proposition, Morgenthau further
demonstrates realism’s complete rejection of instrumental morality and levels a
devastating blow against revisionism when he maintains that the “very juxtaposition of
‘power politics’ and ‘moral politics’ is fundamentally mistaken,” for “morality is not just
another branch of human activity,” but rather it “is superimposed upon them, limiting the
choice of ends and means and delineating the legitimate sphere of a particular branch of
action altogether. This latter action is particularly vital for the political sphere.”72 This
claim is further legitimized by Morgenthau’s direct homage to the Augustinian-Burkean
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framework: “political action can be defined as an attempt to realize moral values through
the medium of politics, that is, power.”73 The ontological relevance of morality to the
power politics of classical realism is indispensable
On the international scene, these ontologically inescapable moral values have gone
unrealized because the nature of the international system is antithetical to the attainment
of such an order. “In the absence of an integrated international society,” Morgenthau
writes, “the attainment of a modicum of order and the realization of a minimum of moral
values are predicated upon the existence of national communities capable of preserving
order and realizing moral values within the limits of their power.”74 The absence of such
an integrated international society is, in essence, the determinant that accounts for the
limited role of morality in the international realm. Concomitantly, the fact that classical
realism contemplates a world composed of an integrated society most clearly suggests
that if such a society were attained, realism could quite easily account for the state of
equilibrium between international morality and politics. This allows classical realism to
account for two important phenomena that have engulfed the contemporary world:
globalization and the formulation of supranational entities by way of integration. Since
realism does not negate the formulation of an integrated international society, but rather
views it extremely beneficial if it may be attained, the theoretical structure of classical
realism becomes both adequate and sufficient in accounting for international phenomena
that create a more integrated, cooperative world. This important realization, however,
brings up an even more important question: while an integrated international society
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could relatively account for more cooperation and harmony in the world, is international
peace a real possibility?
Classical realism maintains that peace may be preserved by two primary devices: 1)
balance of power; and 2) the normative limitation of “international law, international
morality, and world public opinion.”75 Balance of power, however, is not an adequate
device to preserve peace, for its uncertainty, aggravated by the absence of a restraining
moral consensus, leaves balance of power vulnerable as a peace-maintaining device.
International morality, on the other hand, can exert substantial pressure and promote
peace preservation if it could be counter-balanced against the phenomenon of
nationalism. Classical realism suggests a causal relationship between the decline of
international morality and the rise of nationalism, and thus, if nationalism witnesses a
similar decline in the face of the changing circumstances of international politics, then the
world may perhaps observe the rejuvenation of international morality.76 In applying this
premise to the current international scene, it becomes quite feasible to argue that the
nature of regionalization, integration, and globalization are directly tied to the decline of
nationalism and the rise of international morality. In this respect, realism demonstrates a
capacity to account for the state of international cooperation that is taking place in
response to the narrow, myopic interests of nationalism.77
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Similarly, world public opinion—a phenomenon that transcends national boundaries
and asserts itself in uniting much of the world’s reaction to certain political forces—is a
mechanism of enforcing peace if it may be realized on the international scene. While
Morgenthau demonstrates skepticism as to the realization of this phenomenon, since no
historical accounts could be presented, he nonetheless suggests the possibility of world
public opinion, if realized, as being a powerful force on the side of international peace.
The extent to which world public opinion exists in our contemporary world is a subject of
much debate, but the fact that realism is capable of accounting for its potential effect
upon international peace demonstrates the paradigm’s unique capacity to deal with
international cooperation. In contrast, realism finds international law to be extremely
limited and quite ineffective with respect to its effect upon international peace, for unlike
international morality and world public opinion—two phenomena that are based upon
non-legal factors and do not necessitate the existence of external enforcement—
international law is completely contingent upon the presence of a central authority, and
since the nature of the international system has not made such an authority a reality,
international law finds itself dependent upon alliances, diplomacy, and on the previous
two normative limitations: international morality and world public opinion. To this end,
while realism does not undermine the importance of international law, it is aware of its
limits, and for this reason, it understands why powerful states that have invested so much
in international cooperation regularly violate international law.
While attaining peace is one phenomenon, preserving the peace is a distinct
phenomenon itself, and while the two concepts are intertwined, they are in essence two
different categories, with the former being heavily hinged upon the latter. With the three
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normative limitations serving as both peace-creating and peace-preserving factors,
Morgenthau addresses three different categories of peace preservation: peace through
limitation, peace through transformation, and peace through accommodation.
Demonstrating realism’s rejection of political idealism, he negates peace through
limitation and peace through transformation on several grounds, while grounding his
assessment of international peace on the category of peace through accommodation, that
is, diplomacy.78 Diplomacy holds a very unique and prestigious place in the theory of
classical realism, for diplomacy is the practice of advancing and limiting power, securing
and endangering peace, and most importantly, diplomacy is the art of practicing politics.
Used in conjunction with international morality and world public opinion, guided by
moral wisdom, and practiced by statesmen, diplomacy is the greatest and most powerful
weapon for the preservation of peace in the international political system.79
Diplomacy is a strategic tool utilized by the state to implement the objectives of its
national interests, while displaying its prestige and national character. Because of its vital
role, there could be no peace between states without diplomacy, for diplomacy defines
the nature of the relationship between states. Morgenthau establishes nine rules of
diplomacy, with five prerequisites for compromise: 1) diplomacy should be divested of
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the crusading spirit; 2) foreign policy objectives must be defined in terms of national
interest and must be defended with adequate power; 3) diplomacy should look at the
political scene from the point of view of other nations; 4) nations should be willing to
compromise on all issues that are not vital to them; 5) a nation should give up the shadow
of worthless rights in favor of the substance of real advantage; 6) a nation should never
put itself in a position from which it cannot retreat without losing face and cannot
advance without great risks; 7) a nation should not allow a weak ally to make decisions
for it; 8) the armed forces must be the instruments of foreign policy and not its master;
and 9) the government should be the leader of public opinion and not its servant.80
These nine rules, implemented by qualified statesman, are the instrument that could
help establish international peace in the face of the conflicting nature of international
politics. By accommodation, the diplomat advances the interests of the state, while at the
same time complementing the interests of the opposing states. Since the essence of
diplomacy is mutual understanding, its natural objective is a beneficial alliance. With the
diverse interests of the various states being accommodated by mutual concessions and
understandings, alliances provide a framework through which the diplomat attains peace.
Assessed in the context of contemporary international politics, we observe diplomatic
initiatives and unique alliances being the roots of international cooperation, integration,
mutual trust, and more importantly, resurgence in international morality. For as states
develop closer relations born out of diplomatic initiatives, these initiatives provide mutual
trust and obligations, which become strengthened by moral principles that serve as
extensions of such trust and reciprocity. This contention is most evident, for example, in
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the case of the European Union, where diplomacy lies at the heart of the interactions
between the various states, where mutual concessions, agreements, and trust give way to
unique alliances, creating deeper integration and peace. In the case of globalization,
diplomacy is considered to be at the forefront of the development of a worldwide
community, where extensive alliances give way to the formulation of international
institutions, which are further strengthened by excellent diplomatic initiatives. In sum,
regardless of the nature of international cooperation, integration, or peace, one finds
diplomacy at the forefront of the process, structuring itself in the form of alliances, with
the alliances serving as extensions and building blocks of what diplomacy has created. To
this end, realism’s appeal to diplomacy is an adequate and sufficient prescription for
accounting and safeguarding the possibility of international peace.
The introduction in this chapter of realism’s epistemological framework, along with
its fundamental assumptions, explored the structure of the paradigm and the guidelines
through which theory articulation develops. This underlying structure was
complemented by the conceptual, structural, and analytical frameworks of the paradigm,
displaying the core concepts that define realism. These important elements of the
paradigm become effective tools of analysis in the next chapter, where the paradigmbuilding efforts of the neo-approaches are addressed.
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CHAPTER 3
THE NEOREALIST AND NEOLIBERAL CHALLENGE TO REALISM: AN
ATTEMPT AT PARADIGM-BUILDING
The defense of classical realism presented here necessitates an assessment of the
revisionist paradigms against which realism is being defended. Having provided broad
considerations of the principles and conceptual frameworks of realism, this thesis now
conducts an overview of the fundamental presuppositions of both neorealism and
neoliberalism, providing the grounds for a close scrutiny of the level of revisionism
undertaken by both of these paradigms. The theoretical assumptions of both paradigms
are considerable, but even a simple overview would clearly demonstrate that these
theoretical considerations are established upon a two-fold framework: 1) adapting the
essential components of classical realism; and 2) modifying and restructuring these
components in a fashion that becomes compatible with either the microeconomic
principles and sociological structuralism of the neorealist framework, or the
institutionalist, quasi-classical idealist economics of neoliberalism. In any instance, the
foundational considerations of both paradigms, which in essence are the justifiable and
legitimating aspects of any theory—its hard core of premises—are based upon the very
dependable philosophical-theoretical structure of classical realism. The formulation and
the development of these two theories, however, methodically undermines these very
philosophical-theoretical structures upon which the foundations of their paradigms
legitimate themselves through. Thus, classical realism is used to justify and legitimate the

42

foundations of these research programs, while concomitantly being redefined and
restructured to meet their revisionist ends.81

The Passion for Structure: Waltz’s Neorealism
Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism orchestrates a methodological framework that seeks to
construct a coherent and consistent understanding of theory formulation as the foundation
of structuring a research program.82 Waltz holds that the objective of theory is founded
upon its explanatory powers, for theory is not the mere collection of laws but rather
statements that explain them. The explanatory premise also pertains to predictions, Waltz
argues, for although predictions are based on empirical facts and casual connections,
these factors nonetheless need to be explained, for an unexplained prediction minimizes
its capacity to serve its purpose. Theories cannot be formed inductively, induction only
pertains to hypothesizing, leading Waltz to conclude that knowledge must precede
theory, and yet knowledge can proceed only from theory. Thus, theory evolves with
knowledge, but holds no truths, only explaining truths inherent to laws. This is why better
theories replace old ones, for they provide better explanations of phenomena related to
laws.83 Herein lies the first theoretical justification for neorealism’s revision of classical
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realism: the lack of explanatory powers of classical realism necessitated its replacement
with a paradigm with better explanatory theories: neorealism.
In its second framework of revisionism, neorealism introduces its negation of
reductionism, that is, theories are reductionist or systemic not in accordance to what they
deal with, but how they arrange their materials. Reductionism is the methodological
reduction of analysis from the structural level to the unitary/sub-unitary level. The
reductionist approach explains international outcomes through elements and combination
of elements located at the national or sub-national levels. It is a theory about the behavior
of parts, and the internal forces of the unit/actor/agent serving as determinants in
international outcomes. Waltz rejects this reductionist approach as being a trap, for it
negates the systemic structural level of analysis in favor of the national/sub-national
level. Reductionists fail to observe the nature of the international system that accounts for
change, and neorealism holds that it is not possible to understand world politics by
simply looking inside states.84 This premise relates to the initial claim of the inadequacy
of classical realism in its capacity to provide explanatory powers, especially when it
comes to change, for reductionism, which defines its approach, is inherently flawed,
making realism insufficient as a theory.
The static ahistoricism of neorealism maintains that the pattern of continuity
throughout history, which is found in the Westphalia system, provides legitimacy to the
need for a shift from the reductionist approach to a systemic structural approach. The
structure of a system acts as a constraining and disposing force, and because this is the
nature of the systemic structure, systems theories explain and predict continuity within a
system. Thus, systems theory explains change only across systems, not within them. It
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explains how a state will act under certain conditions, how its interactions will be shaped
by the system, and how different units behave similarly despite their variations,
producing outcomes that fall within expected range. These effects of the structure are
observed indirectly, and are produced in two ways: through socialization and through
competition. Through interaction between actors, socialization gives birth to conditions
that are beyond the control of the actors but inherent in the system. This decreases
variety, because all actors engage in similar behavior that is consistent with the structure
of the system. Competition generates order, leading to similarity, since those who survive
adopt similar characteristics that have contributed to their survival. Thus, the structure of
the system affects agents and agencies through providing conditions that promote
socialization and competition.85 This introduces the systemic determinism of
structuralism, disqualifying components of second level analysis as reductionist and
irrelevant, hence revising the very fundamentals of classical realism and supplanting it
with systemic structuralism.
The most dominant concept that defines neorealism is its systemic structuralism,
which holds that a system is composed of a structure and of interacting units. The
structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a
whole. Structures, by their definition, are free of units and attributes. Complementing this
framework, and perhaps being the most important presupposition that gives neorealism’s
appeal to structuralism its logical justification, is the contention that the international
structure is shaped by its anarchic system. From this premise, neorealism defines
structure by three elements: 1) in accordance to the principle by which a system is
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ordered, that is, the arrangement of its units; 2) by the specification of function of
differentiated units;86 and 3) by the distribution of capabilities across units, system
wide.87 In sum, neorealism utilizes the theoretical and conceptual tools of classical
realism as a mechanism of justifying its incorporation of systemic structuralism as the
hard core of its research program, while disregarding important elements and components
of classical realism that could be potentially problematic for structuralism as reductionist
and irrelevant. Three important components of realism are revised by neorealism’s
introduction of structuralism and its application to anarchy at the systemic level. First,
freeing the structure from its units and attributes restricts the capacity of these attributes
to serve as relevant frameworks in the assessment of international phenomena, further
undermining all of the important theoretical and conceptual components of classical
realism, for they are separated from the structural and deemed irrelevant. The second
element that defines neorealism’s conception of structure is applicable only when applied
to a hierarchical system; namely the functions of differentiated units are negated by the
international system, for its structure is that of an anarchic system. Finally, taking the
realist conception of anarchy as a one of the most important foundations of its
philosophic-theoretical structure and abstractly revising it into a systemic structural
model, neorealism uses a revised classical realist concept to deem classical realism itself
as deficient. This chapter will later assess the revisionist nature of structuralism, and the
extent to which its repudiation of reductionism makes neorealism apolitical, posing a
severe problem to its legitimacy as a paradigm.
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The Passion for Institutions: Keohane’s Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism, on the other hand, as embodied in the ideas of Robert Keohane,
utilizes a similar tactic implemented by Waltz; yet Keohane does not hinge the theoretical
justifications of his paradigm’s hard core on realism, but rather uses the valuable
conceptual and theoretical tools of realism to strengthen the framework of his paradigm.88
Thus, while Waltz’s revisionism defines his implementation of structuralism, Keohane’s
revisionism is defined by his instrumental usage of classical realist assumptions. In
adapting realist premises to build an institutionalist framework, neoliberalism proposes
the following premise as the central theme of its paradigm: the existence of a hegemonic
power is neither necessary nor a sufficient condition for international cooperation, for
international institutions facilitate international cooperation; therefore, international
regimes make international cooperation possible without the presence of a hegemon by
alleviating many of the obstacles created by the anarchic international system.
Similar to realist assumptions, neoliberals hold that the greatest danger for the world
political economy and world peace is rooted in political conflicts among states. While
there is no certain way of alleviating this problem, international regimes and institutional
restraint could, to a very strong degree, limit the possibility of conflict through
cooperation.89 Neoliberals accept the state-centric/rational-egoist premise of realism,
arguing that self-interest plays a fundamental role in the formulation of institutions,
which provide the grounds for cooperation. The concept of cooperation, as a theoretical
premise, lies at the heart of neoliberal theory, which is realized in the international
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political realm through international institutions/regimes.90 Cooperation is the mutual
adjustment of policies and behaviors by actors, and such adjustments are usually born out
of discord or potential discord. The necessity of attaining cooperation leads neoliberals to
place emphasis on the creation of international regimes. International regimes are
initiated by the hegemon as a mechanism of providing stability to the international
political economy, yet the maintenance of such regimes does not require the existence of
a hegemon. That is, the institutionalization of cooperation among states by way of
international regimes facilitates the capacity of international regimes to function without
the presence of a hegemon. International regimes are issue-oriented institutions formed
through the cooperation of collectives. They provide information, decrease transaction
costs, monitor compliance, create issue linkages and prevent cheating, all factors in
facilitating cooperation between rational-egoist actors.91 In sum, neoliberal
institutionalism argues that by alleviating the distrust and uncertainty that exist between
states—neoliberalism accepts such concepts as being inherent in the anarchic
international system—international regimes could facilitate cooperation by way of
economic integration and institutional restraint.
The overall theoretical structure of neoliberalism, along with its fundamental
assumptions, are not inherently problematic for classical realism, since neoliberalism
negates a lot of the idealistic assumptions associated with classical liberalism and adapts
the pragmatic assumptions of realism. Neoliberalism’s revisionism, however, becomes
prevalent when it does three of the following. First, it alters and restructures the
conceptual tools that it adapts from realism, specifically the rational-egoist premise.
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Second, it modifies and eventually rejects realism’s conception of human nature. Three, it
presents inherent contradictions for neoliberalism’s own theoretical structure when it
revises and negates these fundamental assumptions. Thus, through the usage of realist
concepts, neoliberalism is able to formulate an institutionalist framework that assesses
cooperation and peace in the world political economy. However, by eventually altering
and revising these fundamental concepts, neoliberalism ends up contradicting its own
foundations. The next section will demonstrate how this revisionism proves to be
extremely problematic for neoliberalism, since its limitation of the rational-egoist
argument ends up resting on a negation of the realist conception of human nature, which
naturally questions the consistency of neoliberalism’s appeal to the self-interest premise
of realism that is essential to the theoretical justification of the formulation of
international institutions, that is, the hard core of the paradigm.

The Neoparadigms Exposed: Revisionism as Contradiction
If Proteus was the god of academic scholarship, revisionism would be his child, the
ever-changing vivacious force, concealing its circumlocution, prevaricating in
articulation, desiccating the originality of the thinker’s ideas, and yet exhibiting itself as
the advocate of the thinker’s unalloyed thought. The thinker is Morgenthau, the idea is
classical realism, the children are the neo-paradigms, and the revisionism is the homage
that these children pay to their father, that chameleon-like force that pierces the soul of
every scholar and encourages creativity, a creativity that is at the expense of another.
Such is the nature of the revisionism suffered by classical realism, where the creativities
of neorealism and neoliberalism are formed at its expense, violating its principles,
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altering its assumptions, and being told that such is being done for its own well-being, for
it is deficient and inadequate, and thus needs the creativity of others to save itself. Yet
realism has displayed, throughout this project, that it is in fact adequate, that it is
sufficient to account for all the great occurrences of international politics, and that the
revisionism that it has suffered at the hands of the neo-paradigms is unjustified.
Both neorealism and neoliberalism have been established on revisionist grounds and
at the expense of classical realism, for both have utilized the fundamental premises of
classical realism for their benefit, but do not adapt the internal consistency of classical
realism’s theoretical structure. This revisionism rests upon a three-tier analytical
framework: 1) the theoretical foundations of the neo-paradigms, that is, the premises that
legitimize their paradigms, are established upon their adaptation of classical realist
assumptions; 2) such revisionist adaptations are inherently antithetical to the theoretical
principles of classical realism, hence disqualifying the legitimacy of such revisionist
adaptations; and 3) the negation of such revisionism proves detrimental to the consistency
of the theoretical structures of the neo-paradigms, for their foundations are justified by
the very adaptations that have become negated as a result of its revisionist nature. Thus,
the legitimacy of the neo-paradigms are disputed, for they are established upon
revisionist grounds, grounds that are antithetical to the very justifying mechanisms that
the neo-paradigms legitimate themselves upon.
This three-tier framework is more consistently demonstrated in the assessment of the
two neo-paradigms: 1) neoliberalism’s revisionism of the rational-egoist argument
structures itself on its negation of the realist conception of human nature, posing severe
theoretical problems to the consistency of neoliberalism’s appeal to the self-interest
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premise, since this premise serves as the justification upon which the formulation of
international institutions is made, that is, the grounds upon which the hard core of the
paradigm is legitimized upon becomes negated; and 2) neorealism’s revisionist rejection
of reductionism—that is, all that is political about classical realism—as grounds for the
implementation of systemic structuralism inherently negates the political, for the
structure becomes paramount to all the assumptions of classical realism, making
neorealism apolitical and incompatible with political realism. To this end, revisionism
makes the theoretical foundations of the neo-paradigms inconsistent, and thus places the
paradigms in contradiction with their very foundations.
For neoliberalism, the relaxation, that is, the revision, of the rational-egoist premise is
vital for emphasizing the importance of international regimes, for bounded rationality, as
a revised alternative, fused with idealist notions of empathy or general reciprocity,
provide grounds for further cooperation.92 By revising the strict assumptions of
rationality, states become emphatically interdependent to each other. This will inevitably
lead to shifts in state preferences, making states more likely to cooperate by means of
international regimes. This revisionism of the rational-egoist premise permits
neoliberalism to alter the concept of self-interest, making it more compatible with its
conception of cooperation. The revisionism of the rational-egoist premise, as an
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Robert E. Keohane argues that maximizing rationality, as embodied in the rational-egoist framework of
realism, is problematic, for such framework views rationality as having absolute capabilities in the form of
maximization. For this reason, neoliberalism advocates bounded-rationality, which “satisfices” rather than
maximizing the capabilities of the rational-egoist actor. This revisionist rationale for restructuring an
important realist premise for its supposed insufficiency is inherently flawed, for it demonstrates an absolute
misunderstanding of realism’s conception of the rational-egoist actor. As Morgenthau so thoroughly
demonstrates, the rationality of the egoist actor is not absolute, but is guided and justified by the important
concept of prudence. Thus, neoliberalism’s disregard for the concept of prudence as a mechanism of
revising the rational-egoist premise to legitimate its institutionalist framework is extremely problematic, for
such disregard is based on false and revisionist grounds. For Keohane’s justification of revising the
rational-egoist premise and introducing bounded rationality, see ibid., pp. 111-116.
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underlying attempt to revise the concept of self-interest, is intrinsically tied to
neoliberalism’s revision of realism’s conception of human nature. Specifically,
neoliberalism rejects that discord is inherent to the nature of actors, because this will
indicate that cooperation is temporary and eventually irrelevant. Thus, neoliberalism
revises the realist conception of human nature as problematic, selfish, and belligerent,
into a conception of the rational-egoist actor intrinsically rotating toward cooperation as
an extension of its self-interest.93 That is, it is often in the self-interest of the rationalegoist actor to cooperate, and if cooperation fails, it is not the nature or the inherent
character of the actor that is at fault, but rather such factors as logistics, circumstances,
and structural failures. In sum, the modification of the realist concepts of the rationalegoist premise and human nature methodically leads to neoliberalism’s revision of the
concept of self-interest, a revisionist premise that tries to legitimize the theoretically
justifiable grounds for the formulations of international institutions and cooperation.
The inherent contradiction and the sheer act of revisionism embedded in the
neoliberal endeavor are most evident, for by altering the realist notion of self-interest into
a revised neoliberal notion of self-interest, the concept may be applied to justify the hard
core of the paradigm: institutional restraint, by way of regimes, leads to cooperation. The
contradiction lies in one simple premise: the incorporation of an idealist notion of selfinterest is inherently antithetical to the realist notion of self-interest, and furthermore,
self-interest is defined by the actor’s selfishness, hence the self, not the alteration of this
notion of selfishness as selfishness being reciprocal in goodwill. By presupposing that
self-interest may be revised along idealist notions, neoliberalism both contradicts
classical realism and classical liberalism, and demonstrates that its attempt at a synthesis
93
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is inherently contradictory and flawed. The nature of this revisionist conception of selfinterest becomes even more problematic for the paradigm’s hard core, for a realist
conception of self-interest obviously cannot account for institution building and
cooperation to the extent that neoliberals demand, hence their revisionism. At the same
time, an appeal to idealism suggests a rejection of self-interest. Since neoliberalism
refrains from subscribing to the latter, but rather revising the former, this subscription to
the former, because of its revisionism, becomes inherently contradictory. This
contradiction hampers the capacity of neoliberalism to justify the formulation of
international institutions on self-interest, for its notion of self-interest, as demonstrated, is
de-legitimized. Thus, with the building block to its theoretical structure being falsified
because of its revisionist nature, all that which have been built upon this premise
themselves become falsified. To this end, the formulation of international institutions as
mechanisms of providing international cooperation fails to have legitimacy, for the
grounds that they are structured upon, the self-interests of the state, are grounds that are
contradictory and false.94 Thus, revisionism as contradiction undermines the consistency
and legitimacy of neoliberalism’s theoretical structure, that is, its hard core.
Revisionism as contradiction proves to be even more problematic for neorealism, for
the very structure of neorealism is developed on the complete reformulation of the basic
principles of classical realism, leading to its negation of the theoretical-philosophical
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This same premise of revisionism as contradiction also falsifies neoliberalism’s notion of collective
security, for the concept is founded upon the very concept of self-interest which was just demonstrated as
contradictory and false. Furthermore, with classical realism vehemently rejecting collective security as
impractical, idealistic, and structurally problematic, the realist conception of self-interest could provide no
grounds for legitimizing collective security. Thus, with the realist notion of self-interest negating collective
security, and with the neoliberal conception of self-interest being shown to be contradictory and flawed, the
same way that the formation of international institutions becomes problematic, so does the theoretical
grounds of legitimizing the concept of collective security. For classical realism’s rejection of collective
security, see Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 290-298.
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structure of the same paradigm which it claims to be saving. This negation, of course, is
born out of the inherent contradictions between the theoretical structure of classical
realism and neorealism’s antithetical stands toward this structure with its introduction of
the sociological concept of structuralism. In applying structuralism at the systemic level
to the study of international politics, neorealism commits three acts of revisionism that
weaken its claims to be the heir of classical realism. First, the systematization of
international politics through the abstract framework of systemic structuralism is a direct
violation of the fundamental assumptions of the realist paradigm, which formulates its
assessment of international phenomena by rejecting systematization and assessing
phenomena as they exist in reality. Second, the rejection or indifference toward actual
international phenomena for the sake of a theory’s narrow presuppositions is an approach
to the study of international relations that is conceptually problematic for classical
realism, for abstract theorizations and systematizations take precedent over reality,
violating the very purpose of studying international relations. Finally, in its most
important act of revisionism, neorealism deems its paradigm apolitical by introducing its
concept of reductionism, disqualifying every component of political realism for the
purpose of accommodating systemic structuralism, hence marginalizing the political.
As discussed earlier, classical realism rejects the interjection of other disciplines into
the autonomy of politics, for such an attempt at a synthesis negates the political for the
sake of the methodological, limiting the approach to the realities of the political realm for
the purpose of accommodating this synthesis. Neorealism does precisely that through its
implementation of sociological structuralism onto the international political domain,
formulating a revisionist paradigm that legitimates its presuppositions upon classical
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realist grounds, yet comes to undermine these very presuppositions through its adherence
to the concept of structuralism. Thus, structuralism, for neorealism, takes precedent over
its assessment of the political realm, for actual political phenomena, which lies at the
heart of analysis for classical realism, become an issue of limited relevance, since reality
is restructured to fit the structuralist framework. The problem with structuralism, as far as
classical realism is concerned, lies in the fact that it is an abstract conceptual framework,
that structure, in and of itself, does not exist, but is rather a methodological framework of
assessing certain systemic factors. As such, the assessment of systemic factors through a
structural framework is systematized to account for pattern and continuity, a new
framework that proves detrimental to neorealism’s subscription to classical realism. By
systematizing the assessment of patterns and continuities along structural lines,
neorealism revises and supplants classical realism’s conception of historicism. The
historical is exchanged in favor of static, atemporal structuralism that is inherently
ahistorical, disregarding the classical realist appeal to such concepts as historic process,
environmental conditions, and the nature of actual international phenomena. The
insensitivity to historicity for the purpose of structuralism demonstrates neorealism’s
revision of realism’s fundamental claim of preserving the autonomy of the political
sphere. By violating this very important principle, neorealism demotes politics to the
depth of irrelevancy, appealing to the negation of reductionism as grounds for the
supremacy of structuralism, and establishing the foundations of its paradigm upon a
questionable premise: revisionism as contradiction in the form of the apolitical.
For all its grand theoretical contentions and conceptual formulations, neorealism fails
to observe one simple premise: it is not a theory of politics, but rather a theory of
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systemic structuralism, one where the political is rejected, and structure lies at the heart
of its theory. In the study of international politics, it is the political that matters, the
interactions between states, the nature of the political structure of the specific states, the
nature of the relationships and diplomatic endeavors between these states. What matters
is the application of all these political components to change and continuity within the
international political system. All such considerations are obviously and inherently
political, where the very essence of international politics is defined by politics itself, with
everything being subordinate to the political, even theoretical and conceptual
frameworks. This, in essence, is the theory of classical realism, the study of politics in all
its forms as it presents itself in the international realm. For neorealism, however, the
political does not and cannot matter, for all that is political is by its nature reductionist,
since politics is the outcome of human action, that is, it is the outcome of reductionist
analysis. By removing the interactions of the state, the nature of these interactions, and
the role of the actors in these interactions, the political, in essence, is being removed, for
all that is political becomes rejected as mere reductionism—that is, it is not structural and
it thus cannot provide for anything that pertains to the systemic level. To this end,
structure defines all that is in the international realm, not the political, and for this reason,
neorealism is apolitical, for the political, in the face of the structural, is simply a nonfactor.
An example is neorealism’s revision of the balance of power theory, perhaps the most
important conceptual framework in classical realism that accounts for systemic factors.
Rejecting classical realism’s assessment of the concept as reductionist, neorealism argues
that balance of power is something which the state strives for, yet it is something that the
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system determines. The capacity and the resilience of the states to preserve the status quo
do not matter, for the intent of the units within the structure is not important. It is the
system that determines the outcome, and to this end, all the unique and important political
endeavors that are undertaken by the powerful states to establish equilibrium are deemed
irrelevant.95 Balance of power, in essence, is something that the structure of the system
produces, and all the important concepts of national power, character, and capability that
classical realism concentrates upon are flawed approaches to understanding international
politics. In more simple terms, to understand the nature of politics and the balance of
power theory, one must remove the political and the balancing game undertaken by the
states out of the equation.
In sum, neorealism accounts for all international phenomena through its systemic
structural framework, contending that the structure is independent of all units and
attributes, in that it is independent of all that is political. Since it is the abstract concept of
structuralism that defines the nature of international politics, domestic politics, in
essence, ceases to serve a purpose, for the determinism of the structure is all that matters,
and not what the political aspires. In this sense, it does not matter what the political actor
does, for the political is subjected to the structural, and since it is the structure that
determines all, the political has neither explanatory nor predictive powers, for it is merely
a subordinate servant to structure. For this reason, the revisionism of the political for the
sake of the structural, the revisionism of the realistic for the sake of the abstract, and the
revisionism of the classical realist for the sake of the irrelevant reductionist, leads to the
conclusion that neorealism is a form of realist structuralism and not a form of structural
realism, for structure is not the adjective but the thing itself, the noun that defines the
95
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paradigm. To this end, by minimizing the political in favor of the structural, neorealism
has inherently contradicted itself as a study of politics, since its apolitical approach has
made neorealism antithetical to the very paradigm it claims to save.
It has not been the intent of this chapter to either discredit or falsify any of the neoparadigms, but to rather demonstrate that their acts of revisionism have contradicted the
very theoretical and conceptual foundations of their respective paradigms. One cannot
deny that to a strong extent, both paradigms do display important explanatory purposes,
and while disagreements may persist as to the extent of such importance, the fact of the
matter remains that both of the neo-paradigms have become powerful forces in the study
of international relations. Having said this, it is only consistent to argue that the method
by which these paradigms are constructed and the process through which they justified
and legitimated their paradigm-building are very problematic. It is for this purpose that
the revisionism undertaken by both of the paradigms has been exposed, allowing this
thesis to demonstrate that their claims of insufficiency and inadequacy leveled against
realism are baseless. Thus, while neoliberalism situates itself in its myopic
institutionalism, as does neorealism in its myopic structuralism, classical realism
transcends any notions of myopism and demonstrates a paradigm that is far more
outreaching, adequate, and sufficient than any of its neo-critics. The wealth of a paradigm
is defined by its explanatory powers and the consistency of such power vis-à-vis the
continuous and dynamic nature of the international political system. By addressing
revisionism, this chapter has sought to elucidate this wealth that classical realism
embodies, and to argue that a close and thorough study of the paradigm would provide
sufficient and adequate answers to all the questions posed by the nature of international

58

politics. To this end, revisionism as contradiction allows realism to escape the injustice
done to it by the neo-paradigms, and to perhaps demonstrate to other scholars that paying
homage to Proteus is problematic and unnecessary.
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CHAPTER 4
CONTRARIA CONTRARIIS CURANTUR: POWER AND THE DIALECTICAL
At the most fundamental level, the objective of this project has been to bring classical
realism in line with modernity,96 that is, to address contemporary opponents of realism
that claim the paradigm is incapable of accounting for the existing international political
system. In the age of modernization, international economic integration, and the
formulation of supranational entities, many scholars claim that the fundamental principles
of classical realism lack the capacity and the explanatory powers to deal with the
international politics of the modern age. In more simple terms, classical realism is
outdated, a nostalgic paradigm that still clinches to the power politics of the past. As
addressed in the second chapter, the revisionist paradigms sought to do just that: to
account for modernity by altering or restructuring components of classical realism that
are deemed incompatible with contemporary international politics. This attempt, albeit
theoretically inconsistent and inherently problematic, brought to light the necessity of
demonstrating whether realism as a progressive paradigm is capable of accounting for
modernity. To this end, the task at hand appears to be a vital one: to demonstrate the
explanatory powers of classical realism as being sufficient in dealing with modernity,
with this sufficiency being justified through the implementation of an original analytical
framework that demonstrates the depth and scope of the paradigm’s philosophical and
theoretical structure.
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The concept of modernity is used within the context of specifying the era in the international political
system following the Cold War, where the bipolar structuration of the international system came to an
abrupt end. The end of the bipolar system, the rise in international organizations and institutions, the
continued integration of supranational entities, the evolving scope of regionalism, and the spread of
globalization have become the international political realities of the modern age, that is, modernity. The
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Introduction to the Dialectical
The fundamental conceptual framework of realism that necessitates theoretical and
empirical justification is its appeal to power as the underlying force in international
politics. The earlier discussion of Morgenthau elucidates the epistemological foundations
of this claim, while the assessments of E.H. Carr, another founder of classical realism,
demonstrate its historical justifications.97 At the same time, the conceptual structure of
power within classical realism and its application to international politics has not been
justified within the context of modernity. That is, while the paradigm’s core thesis is
addressed normatively and historically, it has not been addressed within the context of
modernity, for modernity demands its own separate structure of justification vis-à-vis the
vast difference between the international politics of the past and the present. To this end,
one fundamental question related to the realist conception of power must be addressed:
does power, defined within the interests and actions of the rational state-actor, provide
accountability for the nature of modern international relations?
The theoretical-analytical model that provides an answer to this question is the
dialectical model developed here. Hegelian in structure, Clasewitzian in context, and
original in its application to modernity, this model will provide accountability,
consistency, and strength to the explanatory powers of classical realism as it takes on the

term “modernity” will be used interchangeably with the term “modern age,” since both terms will be a
reference to the post-bipolar international system as specified above.
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Since this paper’s concentration is primarily on Hans J. Morgenthau as the leading source of classical
realism, the discussion has been limited specifically to him. However, it is important to note E.H. Carr’s
contribution to the paradigm by way of his historical assessment of realism. Carr’s study of history,
especially in the works of Thucydides and Machiavelli, provide a historically developed assessment of
realist theory and its consistent presence throughout history. In this sense, Carr’s contribution to realism is
valued for its attention to the historical context. At the theoretical and epistemological level, Carr’s main
emphasis has been his intense criticism of idealism when compared to the political thought of realism. See
E.H. Carr, The Twenty Year’s Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations,
(London: Macmillan Press, 1974).
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challenges of modernity. While the proposed dialectical model is systemic, it does not
suggest a systematization of realism, but rather a systematic justification of the concept of
power defined in terms of interests of the state.98 Furthermore, since the very nature of a
dialectical model suggests dynamic and constant change via historicism, the application
of such a model is compatible with classical realism, for it demonstrates a capacity for
flexibility and accountability in the face of modernity.
As specified in the previous chapter, realism’s reliance on power, as a conceptual
framework that defines the state’s notion of interest, is not based on a specific or a set of
theoretical presuppositions, but rather upon the observation that power defines the nature
of international politics within the existing international system. More specifically, power
is the vital center of attention in the assessment of international politics because such
happens to be the reality of things. To this end, an emphasis on power via the dialectical
model is not absolute, for it holds true only to the extent where which power maintains its
status as the determining component of international relations. Namely, if the
phenomenon of power, in its existing conceptual structure, is altered or limited by a
change or an alteration within the international system itself, then realism’s conception of
power would both accommodate and shift in accordance with the realities of the
international system.99 Consequently, any other claims pertaining to realism’s conception
of power vis-à-vis the international system—that is, any claim which neglects to deal
with the flux in the international system—would be deemed static, ahistorical, and
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deterministic presuppositions that are structurally irreconcilable with the principles of
classical realism.
The dialectical model presented here is Hegelian in structure, meaning that the
dialectical process proceeds and develops in accordance with the dialectical structure
presented in Hegelian philosophy. Hegelian dialectics maintains that all logic and world
history follow a certain dialectical path, where internal contradictions are transcended and
give rise to contradictions that themselves require resolution. Building upon this initial
premise, dialectical thought argues that reality is not simply a state of affairs, but rather
an ongoing historical process, where the key to understanding reality lies in the ability to
understand the very nature of change. Thus, historical change is not simply a random
process, but rather obeys a discoverable law. This discoverable law of change is the
dialectic, which, itself, is comprised of a three-fold process: 1) the unity of opposites, in
that the nature of everything involves internal opposition of contradiction; 2) quantity and
quality, in that quantitative change always eventually leads to qualitative change; and 3)
negation of the negated, in that change negates what is changed, and the result is in turn
negated, but this second negation leads to a further development and not a return to that
which it began. This process is also known as the repeated triadic movement of a thesis
giving rise to its reaction, an antithesis which contradicts or negates the thesis, and the
tension between the two being resolved by means of a synthesis.100 At the ontological
level, Hegel further demonstrates the structural formation of the dialectical process when
he describes a dialectic of existence: first, existence must be posited as pure Being; but
pure Being, upon examination, is found to be indistinguishable from Nothing, and when
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it is realized that what is coming into being is, at the same time, also returning to nothing,
both Being and Nothing are united as Becoming.
The dialectical model of this thesis strictly adheres to the ontological,
epistemological, and structural formulation of Hegelian dialectics, and it is to this end
that it is maintained that the proposed theoretical model is Hegelian in structure. In
context, however, this thesis implements a Clausewitzian approach, that is, the Hegelian
context is both vast and universalistic, applying to theoretical models that address vast
concepts such as development of history and the historical process. This makes it difficult
to address conceptual and theoretical models that are not vast in context, such as the
concept of power, which is only one component of history and the historical process.
Therefore, while the purity of the Hegelian structure is preserved, the context is used
within a Clausewitzian approach. Carl von Clausewitz applied Hegelian dialectics to his
study of the philosophy of war in human history, and as such, he used the dialectical to
understand and trace the nature of war, the internal complexities of war, and its overall
relation to history and politics. Clausewitz’s important claim, via the dialectical model, is
his assessment that war should be used as an instrument of policy, and to this end, war
must serve the interests of the state. The Clausewitzian approach, therefore, takes the
universal context of Hegelian dialectics and applies it to a more concrete process, the
conceptual development of war in history.101 It is in this respect that this thesis claims its
context is Clausewitzian, in that it takes the universal Hegelian context and applies it to a
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more concrete process, the development of the concept of power within the political
philosophy of realism.
The nature of attaining the ultimate state objective in realist philosophy, power, is
inherently defined by the logic of the process. That is, the logic of power. As defined in
the Chapter 2, the realist conception of power refers to any specific conceptual premise
by which one actor attains and practices control over another actor (this clearly entails
control over the actor’s resources and the events and outcomes of the relationship). Thus,
when dealing with the realist conception of power, one is confronted with a two-fold
theoretical framework: 1) the objective of attaining power, that is, the rationale by which
power serves the interests of the state; and 2) the mechanism of attaining power, that is,
the process by which the concept of power comes to be defined within realist political
philosophy. Each of these theoretical frameworks is further conceptualized and
developed within the dialectical process. More specifically, the thesis-antithesis dialectics
of the first model result in a synthesis, as does the dialectical model of the second
theoretical framework. The synthesis of the first theoretical model (the dialectical
development of the concept of interest) becomes contradicted in opposition, or the
antithesis, of the synthesis of the second model (the dialectical development of the
concept of power), leading to the formulation of the next step in the larger dialectical
process. The outcome of the two dialectical models provides for the final synthesis: the
logic of power, or to use Max Weber’s vocabulary, zweckrational, final rationality.
This proposed dialectical model does two things: 1) it demonstrates that the concept
of power follows a certain logic in realist philosophy, in that the misleading contention
that realist philosophy advocates the attainment of power for the sake of power is a claim
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that is rejected and demonstrated to be an underdeveloped stage in the dialectical process;
and 2) this logic, in turn, is governed by final rationality, that is, the interest of the state.
In this sense, the final resolution/synthesis of the dialectical model is the harmonization
of the interests of the state with the objectives of its power structure. By demonstrating
that the interests of the state are a byproduct of the complex dialectical process, and are
born out of its synthesis with the very process of developing the logic of power, it
becomes clear that the concept of interest defined in terms of power is a final dialectical
process governed by rationality. Therefore, the concept of national/state interest and the
concept of power are not vague conceptual frameworks that are open for criticism
because of such presupposed vagueness, but are rather the byproducts of a specific and
concrete dialectical process, where interest and power are synthesized in a final,
harmonious resolution.

The Development of Interest: A Dialectical Model
Policy formulation, or the rationale for attaining power, that is, interest itself, is
developed and defined by the ends-means dialectic. The ends-means dialectic, like the
process itself, proceeds through a hierarchical fashion, with each step up in the hierarchy
resulting in a synthesis, and hence leading the way to the final resolution. More
specifically, at the initial stage of the dialectical model, policy formulation begins with
the prudent assessment of tactics, with tactics serving as the means, and by its internal
contradictions dialectically synthesizing with strategy, or the ends. Thus, tactics, at the
initial stage, are the means of attaining strategy, which is the ends, or the antithesis,
within this starting level of the hierarchical dialectic process. The end of all tactics is a
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strategy, in that all tactics are themselves the means. The tactics, therefore, are the
various methods or means by which a policy may be formulated, that is, the development
of strategy.
Following this line of thought, it appears that the superior ends that strategy aims at
govern the dispositions taken by tactics. This dialectical relationship between the tacticstrategy antitheses synthesizes into policy formulation, completing this initial stage of the
dialectical process and beginning the next level in the hierarchy. The constant dialectical
struggle between tactic and strategy, with the former consistently serving the ends of the
latter, results in a fusion of the two concepts, hence the synthesis and the resolution of
this specific dialectical stage. Policy formulation refers specifically to the orchestration of
the forms of policy that determine the objectives of the attainment of power. The range,
both theoretically and practically, of the structuration of the area of policy formulation is
clearly linked to the ends and means dialectic. This, once again, pertains to the
conceptualization of one component of the dialectical model serving as the means to the
ends of the other component, or the antithesis, of the model. Thus, if policy formulation
is the synthesis of the initial stage in the hierarchy of the dialectical model, what, then,
forms the next stage of the hierarchy by serving as the antithesis of policy formulation?
The antithesis to policy formulation is action: the method by which the
implementation of policy formulation is operationalized. Action, in its opposition and
contradiction to policy formulation, gives way for the development of this specific
dialectical stage. The ends-means dialectic of the tactic-strategy antitheses resolved into
the formulation of a synthesis: policy formulation. Policy formulation, as a byproduct of
the dialectical process, becomes contradicted and opposed by the probability of action,
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that is, the action necessary to make the abstract/theoretical (policy formulation) into the
practical (concrete action).
Action, whether in the form of specific acts of violence, war, diplomacy, economic
sanctions, or any other form of political action, functions with the view of imposing one
side’s will on the other, that is, allowing for the practical realization and materialization
of the state’s formulated policy. In this specific dialectical capacity, action serves as the
means, with the implementation of the formulated policy being the ends of such means.
Without a synthesis these two diametrically opposed thesis-antitheses remain opposed
and unresolved, for a formulated policy without implementation simply remains an
abstract or a theoretical assumption without any capacity for practical relevance. Action,
on the other hand, absent of a formulated policy and contradicted in its practical
emptiness to the theoretically abstract—that is, lacking a mechanism for the practical
implementation of its very policies—remains a means without an end. The necessity for a
resolution, therefore, allows the dialectical process to produce a synthesis and complete
this specific stage within the hierarchy. The synthesis of this stage is extremely important
for the dialectical process, for it leads to the development of the next and final stage
within this specific theoretical model: the dialectically developed concept of interest.
More specifically, the completion of this stage completes this specific hierarchical model
itself, and this completion takes form in the resolution of policy formulation and action
into a very important synthesis: the objective of attaining power is the interest of the
state.
The synthesis of the formulated policies, as one component of the dialectical process,
with the actions necessary for the implementation of such policies, as the other
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component, results in the realization of what the interest of the state is, or, what to do
with the powers attained by the state. Since the objective of the state is itself the interest
of the state, the determination of the objectives of the state’s attained powers is the same
thing as asserting what the interests of the state are. In more simple terms, the policies
that determine the ends for which the attained power should be used for are, in essence,
the policies that are born out of the dialectical process and hence provide for the
developed conception of state interest. The interests of the state are undoubtedly the
ultimate ends of the state, for the state’s very existence is defined by properly
understanding what its interests are. However, this dialectical process that allows for such
realization is vital to the very development of interest, for a state’s interest is not the
byproduct of a simple decision by a specific leader or a group of leaders, but rather an
extensive dialectical process that engulfs the entire state. From tactics and strategy, to
policy formulation and action, to the realization of what the state’s interests are, the state
and its institutions and functional mechanisms become overwhelmed and are dictated by
the dialectical process. More precisely, the logic of defining the interests of a state is
inherently a dialectical process, for the dialectical is the very process by which such logic
is born.
INTEREST / INTEREST AT ITS DEVELOPED STAGE
(synthesis)
↑
POLICY FORMULATION ↔ ACTION
(synthesis)
(antithesis)
↑
TACTIC ↔ STRATEGY
(thesis)
(antithesis)
_________________________________________________________
Dialectical model, the development of the concept of interest
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The Logic of Power: Power as Dialectical Evolution
Having dialectically traced the development of the concept of interest through the
hierarchical, theoretical model presented above, this section presents the second
theoretical model: the dialectical development of the concept of power. Only after the
development and the realization of what the concept of power actually means in realist
philosophy could one then proceed to the next stage in the dialectical model, the struggle
between power and interest for the final resolution. Power, however, unlike interest, is
itself formulated by two theoretical models: development of power and the development
of morality. That is, while the development of interest is defined by a singular theoretical
model, power is also defined by an overarching singular model, with the minor exception
being the necessity of the introduction and fusion of morality, a separate model, into the
larger theoretical model for the concept of power.
In realist philosophy, any assessment of power begins at the ontological level with a
consideration of the paradigm’s conceptualization of human nature. It is at this initial
stage that the hierarchical dialectical process initiates the theoretical model of accounting
for the nature and development of power in realism. It begins with Morgenthau’s
observation of the interaction between the existing world and human nature as being
caught up in a dialectical melee of “unceasing struggle between good and evil, reason and
passion, life and death…peace and war—a struggle which so often ends with the victory
of the forces hostile to man.”102 It is a world, therefore, of opposing interests, driven by
conflict, opposite of interests, and internal contradictions, with its roots in human nature,
particularly two human traits: selfishness and lust for power. These two components of
human nature formulate the first stage of the hierarchy of power in the dialectical model,
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as one human trait engages in a dialectical clash with the other, its antithesis. This
premise is further clarified by Morgenthau’s examination of the relationship between
selfishness, lust for power, and conflict (the dialectical struggle). Selfishness, realism
holds, has rational limits, for it has an “objective relation to the vital needs of the
individual” and “offers the best chances for survival under the particular natural and
social conditions under which the individual lives.”103 This rational capacity of
selfishness, along with its functional relevance vis-à-vis human survival, is not enough to
explain the unending nature of conflict among men. Thus, it is its antithesis that is the
root of conflict and evil, since man’s desire for power, Morgenthau holds, is an “allpermeating fact which is of the very essence of human existence,” one which has no
limits, and unlike selfishness, it cannot be appeased by concessions.104 The desire for
power constitutes the ubiquity of evil in human action.
This dialectical struggle between rational selfishness as a mechanism of survival and
the desire for power as the underlying cause of evil in human nature formulates a
synthesis that completes the initial stage of this hierarchical model: brute force, that is,
attaining power for the sake of power. This synthesis of brute force that is born out of the
selfish-power lusting antithesis comes into being through the internal contradictions and
the eventual resolution of the contradictions between the two components of human
nature. Selfishness, as the rational mechanism of survival, synthesizes with the unending
desire for power, with the resolution being a calculated and selfish desire for power: brute
force. Brute force, at this dialectical stage, is not completely rational, for it is rational
only to the extent of serving its selfish ends, namely, attaining power for the sake of
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attaining power. The ends-means dialectical in this process is quite convoluted, for they
are one and the same, since the attainment of power is both the means and the ends of the
brute force synthesis.
This stage of the dialectical model presents an inherent ethical horror, for brute force
presents human action at its most vicious level, since this new lust for power “is not
merely blended with dominant aims of a different kind but is the very essence of the
intention, the very life-blood of the action,” for “politics is a struggle for power over men,
and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its ultimate goal.”105 The dialectic
formulation of brute force, however, is not the conception of power that realism defines,
since brute force is incomplete as a concept of power, for it becomes caught in a
dialectical struggle with its antithesis, morality. This is one of the most misunderstood
components of realism: that brute force is the concept of power realism speaks of when it
discusses its notion of power. Such suggests a complete misunderstanding of both realism
and the dialectical process, for the concept of power, at this stage of the dialectical
process, is not yet developed, and therefore, brute force is power at its undeveloped level.
Realism’s conception of power, however, is the notion of power at its highest developed
level in the dialectical model, and this level of development is attained when brute force
is synthesized with its antithesis, morality. For this reason, this thesis turns to a dialectical
assessment of morality as it develops in the hierarchical model and becomes the
antithesis to brute force.
Morality, at is most basic level, is addressed in realist philosophy upon ontological
and metaphysical grounds, this being individual or universalistic morality. Morality, in
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this sense, refers to the general issues of ethics, values, right, wrong, and other factors of
the sort, both at the personal level, and more importantly, at the universal level. To this
end, realism accepts a certain notion of morality that pertains to all of humanity: morality
is not relative. This notion of individual/universal morality finds itself in an “ineluctable
tension” with state or political morality.106 This tension between the two forms of
morality within realist philosophy provide for the formulation of the initial stage of the
dialectical process that assesses the theoretical model concerning morality.
The dichotomous complexity between individual/universal morality and
state/political morality is defined by the dialectical struggle between the forces of the
political realm and the virtues of the moral realm. As specified in Chapter 2, the inherent
contradictions between the two forms of morality are born out of the state’s necessity to
adhere to the ultimate goal of the state, that is, the preservation of its interests. This, at
times, comes into contradiction with the principles of individual/universal morality,
giving way to the dialectical struggle of the individual/universal-state/political antithesis.
Furthermore, the thesis-antithesis conflict between the two moralities is further
exacerbated by conceptual and structural factors, since individual/universal morality is
idealistic and abstract, while state/political morality is pragmatic and concrete. This
clearly makes the struggle between the two concepts natural for realism, for the moral
aspirations of the state are quite different from universal morality, and to this end, until a
synthesis is attained between the two dialectical components, the two principles of
morality remain contradicted and at opposite ends.
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The synthesis of the two diverging notions of morality gives birth to the following
resolution: interest defined in terms of morality, that is, that which is moral is in the
interest of the state, and that which is in the interest of the state is moral.107 This
dialectical fusion of universal/individual and state/political morality formulates a
synthesized notion of morality that defines the concept of morality at its fullest developed
stage within the dialectical model. More specifically, universal/individual morality and
state/political morality are both underdeveloped notions of morality within the hierarchy
of the dialectical process, and it is only when the two underdeveloped notions of morality
become synthesized that the actual realist conception of morality is fully developed. To
this end, morality within the lexicon of classical realism is defined as such only at its
developed stage, which allows for the completion of this specific dialectical model and
formulates the beginning of the next stage: the dialectical clash between the theoretical
model of morality and its antithesis, brute force. It is with the synthesis of these
antitheses that the entire dialectical model of power is resolved, for the resolution of the
contradictions between morality and brute force by way of a synthesis allows for a final
conceptual definition of what power is within the philosophy of classical realism.
Therefore, the next stage of the dialectical process traces the dialectical clash between
morality and brute force, and the eventual synthesis of these two concepts that gives birth
to the realist conception of power.
Morality, at its developed stage within the hierarchical model, becomes contradicted
by its antithesis, brute force, as the dialectical process of negations proceeds to formulate
the realist conception of power at its developed stage. Morality, with its conceptual and
dialectically developed tool of interest playing a role of reciprocity within the theoretical
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model of morality, is still incomplete as a conceptual framework within the larger
theoretical model of power. As one of the dialectical components of power, morality is
only capable of completing this dialectical stage by synthesizing itself with its antithesis.
The antithesis, brute force, as discussed earlier, is also an underdeveloped dialectical
component of power—that is, while morality is developed within its own conceptual
framework, it only remains incomplete within the larger theoretical framework of
power—brute force, however, is altogether incomplete, for brute force presents no
conceptual model of its own, but rather falls within the larger theoretical framework of
power. Accordingly, since brute force is far too deficient and underdeveloped as both a
concept and a component within the hierarchical dialectical process, its synthesis with
morality becomes a necessity, a natural outcome of the dialectical resolution that gives
way to the formulation of the realist conception of power.
The dialectical dance between morality and brute force is a vital point of
concentration in realist philosophy, for Morgenthau specifies his rejection of the
instrumental usage of morality by the state, that is, the “drive for power” must not be
concealed under the guise of morality.108 This direct negation of brute force by
Morgenthau demonstrates the internal contradictions of the two antitheses, for realism
refrains from rejecting morality in favor of the brute objectives of the state, that is, the
attainment of power for the sake of power. At the same time, it does not allow morality,
at the universal level, to interfere with the interests of the state. However, at its developed
stage, morality takes precedence over brute force in the dialectical struggle, for in the
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final synthesis of the two concepts, morality is “superimposed” upon the justificatory
mechanisms of force in the conceptual framework of power.109
This premise is extremely important for the potential resolution of this specific
dialectical stage, for Morgenthau consistently appeals to moral restraint in the face of
brute force, maintaining that morality should serve as a guide to political action, yet this
is acceptable to the extent that the realities of the political conditions allow it, that is, the
preservation of the state’s interests. This dialectical struggle is a consistent problem for
realist theory at this stage of the dialectical process, for morality, as a mechanism of state
policy, is inherently problematic, since it limits or hampers the state’s capacity for the
formulation or the full development of its interests. More specifically, morality cannot
serve as the ends of a state’s objective, and to this end, neither could it serve as a means.
Hence the necessity of power to serve as a mechanism of implementation. At this stage,
however, the concept of power itself is not fully developed, for it is brute force, and as a
mechanism of implementation, brute force is quite limited and underdeveloped, since it
lacks the means to rationally calculate the ends or the objectives of the state. It is at this
point that a synthesis begins to take form between the antitheses, for morality remains
incapable of serving the interests of the state without a mechanism of implementation,
while brute force, as a mechanism of implementation, is not developed enough within the
dialectical process to undertake this task.
Morgenthau directly addresses this dialectical dilemma: “the lust for power as
ubiquitous empirical fact and its denial as universal ethical norm are the poles between
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which this antinomy is suspended.”110 This dialectical process between the two poles of
an antinomy forms the foundations of realism’s attempt to accommodate this dialectical
struggle and its potential synthesis: the direct application of moral imperatives to the
political realm will yield disaster, while to altogether abandon the moral imperatives and
resort to brute force will negate the very concept of morality. Morgenthau’s synthesis of
this dialectical stage is an overall negation of brute force in relation and in comparison to
morality. Morality, in and of itself, is the byproduct of an entire dialectical model, since
morality is at its highest/fullest developed stage, while brute force, as discussed
extensively, remains underdeveloped by way of the dialectical. Morgenthau elaborates on
this point by maintaining that when the state engages in an assessment of a certain
political action, it is both prudent and necessary that such action be judged by moral
principles. 111 This rationale, he suggests, is sanctioned by the dialectical process itself,
for the “dialectic of ethics and politics” inhibits brute force, “in spite of itself, from
escaping” morality’s “judgment and normative directions.”112
This limitation of brute force during the synthesis process of this dialectical stage
becomes an ontological necessity if a synthesis with morality is to take place. More
specifically, Morgenthau attempts to suggest that brute force is not even the equal of
morality within the dialectical process (as mentioned earlier, morality is developed, while
brute force is not), for the “very juxtaposition of ‘power politics’ and ‘moral politics’ is
fundamentally mistaken,” since “morality is not just another branch of human activity,”
but rather it “is superimposed upon them, limiting the choice of ends and means and
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delineating the legitimate sphere of a particular branch of action altogether.”113 The
synthesis of brute force and morality, therefore, is the dialectical formulation of the
realist conception of power: force as a mechanism of action and implementation as
guided and limited by the principles of morality. This synthesis is the completion of the
dialectical model for power; since, power, as a concept within realist theory, comes into
being and is hence developed by way of resolving the dialectical struggle between brute
force and morality. The resolution to this dialectical struggle, power, is the negation of
brute force as a form of action and the fusion of morality with political action, that is,
prudent action. Morgenthau writes, “political action can be defined as an attempt to
realize moral values through the medium of politics, that is, power.”114 Thus, it is power,
in its complete, developed stage that allows for the realization of moral political action.
To this end, power in realism is defined as “man’s control over the minds and actions of
other man,” yet the extent and the mechanism by which such control is practiced are
further defined by its moral principles. This dialectical resolution provides power its
capacity for reason, that is, power in realism is not brute or blind force, but rather force
that is born out of prudent action and moral guidance. This becomes fundamental as the
completed dialectical model of power itself becomes entangled in a dialectical struggle
with its antithesis, the completed dialectical model of interest. And it is the final synthesis
of power and interest that completes the dialectical process, providing the final rationality
for the most important concept in realism: power defined in terms of interest.
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POWER/ POWER AT ITS DEVELOPED STAGE
(synthesis)

↑
BRUTE FORCE
(thesis)

BRUTE FORCE

↔MORALITY
(antithesis)

MORALITY/ MORALITY AT ITS DEVELOPED STAGE

(synthesis)

(synthesis)

↑

↑

SELFISHNESS ↔ LUST FOR POWER
(thesis)

STATE MORALITY ↔ UNIVERSAL MORALITY

(antithesis)

(thesis)

(antithesis)

________________________________________________________________________
Dialectical model, the development of the concept of power, with a fusion of the concept of morality

Interest Defined in Terms of Power: Final Synthesis
The final hierarchical stage of the dialectical process is the resolution of the two main
models discussed in this chapter: the dialectical model of the development of interest (the
tactic-strategy antithesis, its synthesis: policy formulation; policy-action antithesis, its
synthesis: interest, that is, interests of the state) and the dialectical model of the
development of power (the selfishness-lust for power antithesis, its synthesis: brute force;
brute force-morality antithesis: its synthesis: power, that is, prudent action). The
dialectical struggle between the interest-power antitheses is further defined by the meansends nature of this dialectical. This pertains to the specific nature of each of the
components in this final dialectical stage: power, as one component, serving as the means
to the end of the other component, interest. The following diagram provides a visual of
the final model:
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INTEREST DEFINED IN TERMS OF POWER/FINAL RATIONALITY
(final synthesis)
↑
POWER
↔
INTEREST
(thesis)
(antithesis)
________________________________________________________________________
Dialectical model, the final resolution, interest defined in terms of power, final rationality

POWER/ POWER AT ITS DEVELOPED STAGE
(synthesis)

↑
BRUTE FORCE
(thesis)
BRUTE FORCE
(synthesis)

↔ MORALITY
(antithesis)

MORALITY/ MORALITY AT ITS DEVELOPED STAGE
(synthesis)

↑

↑

SELFISHNESS ↔ LUST FOR POWER
STATE MORALITY ↔ UNIVERSAL MORALITY
(thesis)
(antithesis)
(thesis)
(antithesis)
________________________________________________________________________
Dialectical model, the development of the concept of power, with a fusion of the concept of morality

INTEREST / INTEREST AT ITS DEVELOPED STAGE
(synthesis)

↑
POLICY FORMULATION
(synthesis)

↔ ACTION
(antithesis)

↑
TACTIC ↔ STRATEGY
(thesis)
(antithesis)
_________________________________________________________

Dialectical model, the development of the concept of interest

As discussed in Chapter 2, and dialectically developed in this chapter, the concept of
interest within realism is the overarching set of policies that define what the objectives of
the state are. Chapter 2 demonstrates the components of prudence, risk maximizationminimization factors, and rationality assumptions as frameworks defining the specific
conceptual understanding of interest in realist philosophy. The dialectical model
presented in this chapter demonstrated the process by which interest comes into being
and the method through which it evolves and reaches its state of development. Similar to
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interest, the same analytical process was presented for the concept of power, from its
theoretical and definitional assessments in Chapter 2 to its dialectical development in this
chapter. At its developed stage, both of these concepts seek a dialectical fusion, that is, a
final synthesis that serves as the final rationality, the logic of power. More specifically,
the dialectical struggle between interest and power is in essence a mean-ends struggle, for
to properly understand the axiomatic thesis of realism (interest defined in terms of power)
a synthesis is necessitated of this final dialectical stage to produce a final resolution.
The interest, or the objective, of a state is to attain power, that is, to establish control
of all the specific components within the international system that will contribute to the
preservation of the state’s interests. Thus, it is in the interest of the state to preserve its
interest. Power is the mechanism of establishing control, and thus, power becomes an
interest in and of itself. But power, as an interest, is incomplete, for it becomes
meaningless tautology to claim that power is interest and it is in the power’s interest to
preserve its interest, that is, power. In more simple terms, the attainment of power for the
sake of attaining and preserving power is an incomplete interest of the state, for it only
serves as a single interest, its own (power’s) preservation. The state, however, formulates
interest not only for the sake of power, but for the sake of all that is in fact in the interest
of the state. Therefore, when maintaining that it is in the interest of the state to preserve
its interest, this thesis is specifically asserting that it is in the interest of the state to have
power, for power is necessary in preserving the interests, or all the other objectives, of the
state. Therefore, power is only one interest, and when realism asserts that it defines
interest in terms of power, it is in fact formulating the final synthesis of the dialectical
model: power, as an act of political action, becomes fused with its opposite, interest, and
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thus becomes a form of interest. The synthesis, therefore, is the final rationality and logic
of power: power as policy of the state, that is, power as an interest of the state serving all
the interests of the state. Thus, the ends-means dialectical also completes itself, for
although as an interest power is an end in and of itself, it is at the same time a means to
other ends, the other interests of the state. Hence the final resolution to the dialectical
model and the final rationality of power: interest defined in terms of power.
Collectively, this chapter has provided the theoretical, structural, and conceptual
justifications for the all-important role of power in the philosophic and epistemological
structure of realism. In doing so, it has also burdened itself with achieving five important
tasks. First, defining the very nature of power in realist philosophy. Second, elucidating
how the concept of power in realist thought has not been thoroughly understood and
grasped by international relations scholars. Third, demonstrating that the concept of
interest is not merely a vague conceptual premise, but rather a concrete and developed
framework within the dialectical model. Fourth, demonstrating that the notion of power is
not a relative or vague concept within realism, but rather a developed and structured
framework within the dialectical model. And fifth, demonstrating that the realist concept
of interest defined in terms of power is a complex, highly-developed, and theoretically
rich conceptual model that is epistemologically legitimated and justified by synthesizing
power and interest into a final rationality within the dialectical structure.
Accordingly, this thesis once again poses the previously stated question: does power,
as defined within the interests and actions of the rational state-actor, explain the nature of
modern international relations? Realism provides the following answer: since the interest
of the state is its very own preservation, and since this preservation is reliant upon power
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(that is, the capacity to control all such variables which secure the preservation of the
state’s interests), then the interests and actions of the rational state-actor are and must be
defined in terms of power!
In conclusion, this chapter provided an original and in-depth assessment of realism’s
underlying structuration, through which the formulation of several of the paradigm’s
fundamental assumptions are demonstrated along with the intrinsic and intricate nature of
how these fundamental assumptions are intertwined and developed in the dialectical
process. Chapter 4 also demonstrated that the epistemological framework of the realist
paradigm is formed in an iron-clad structure, where each developing assumption or
conceptual framework is justified as it evolves to its final developed stage. This method
of inquiry introduces international relations scholarship to an understanding of realism
that has not been explored before. As such, this original approach provides realism with
much more strength as a paradigm, for it demonstrates that the paradigm is not preserved
upon ad hoc auxiliaries or added conceptual frameworks, but rather upon its internal and
original theoretical-philosophical model.
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CHAPTER 5
THE POWER OF POWER POLITICS: A DEFENSE
An adequate attempt to defend classical realism, or for that matter to extol the
paradigm, cannot be simply established on a defense against the revisionist neoparadigms, nor on an original and thorough exploration of the paradigm's philosophical
and theoretical structure. Thus, while it has been demonstrated that classical realism is in
fact a powerful enough paradigm to satisfy and negate the claims of insufficiency by the
revisionists, it must also be demonstrated as to whether realism is adequate and
progressive enough to rebuff the claim that it is a degenerative paradigm. In essence, it
must be demonstrated that realism is a scientifically adequate approach for explaining
behavior in international relations. The most difficult component of defending classical
realism against its contemporary critics is the fact that almost all scholars consider
classical realism, neorealism, and all other forms of minimal-realist approaches to be part
of the same paradigm. As such, when confronting such critical scholarship, one is faced
with a two-fold problem: 1) it becomes necessary to demonstrate that classical realism is
completely separate from the revisionist "realist" paradigms (as it has been done in this
project); and 2) one finds that most of the criticism is against the revisionist approaches,
but since the revisionists are deemed to be an extension of the classical realists, scholars
accept all forms of criticism leveled against all forms of realists to be a falsification of the
paradigm itself. By separating classical realism from the revisionists, and by
demonstrating the limits of the claim that the neo-paradigms are the next evolution in the
paradigm, this thesis has shown that not only is its criticism of the neo-paradigms
consistent with the criticism provided by other scholars, but that such criticism should not
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and cannot be applied to classical realism. To this end, only critiques that are specifically
directed at classical realism can be deemed criticisms of the paradigm itself, and as such,
an attempt must be made to address such scholarship. The most notable critique in IR
scholarship that has been leveled against Morgenthau's realism has been the one provided
by John Vasquez, in his work, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique. To that end,
employing the dialectically developed theoretical frameworks of the previous chapter,
this chapter addresses Vasquez's attempt at falsifying realism as a progressive paradigm.

The Anatomy of a Paradigm: Realism and the Philosophy of Science
Using philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn's framework of evaluating what
constitutes scientific inquiry, John Vasquez attempts to determine "whether the realist
paradigm has adequately guided inquiry in international relations."115 However, before
proceeding to a discussion of classical realism as the leading research program in IR
scholarship, and the extent to which Kuhn's philosophy of science deems realism
progressive or degenerative, Vasquez concedes that Kuhn's philosophy of science has
itself been the subject of much criticism. As such, Vasquez opens up with a defense of
Kuhn, for a defense of Kuhn is in essence a defense of Vasquez's overall attempt at
falsifying realism as a paradigm, since the structure and criteria presented by Vasquez
relies on the set of propositions presented in the writings of Thomas Kuhn. Vasquez
seeks to do three things: 1) he attempts to clarify and define what Kuhn means by his
concept of a paradigm; 2) whether Kuhn's description of scientific change is correct; and
3) establish the framework and structure through which a paradigm is evaluated.
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Vasquez concedes that Kuhn's usage of the paradigm concept is both vague and hard
to define, since in his text, Kuhn has nearly 21 different uses for the concept.116 An
attempt by Kuhn to reformulate the concept has not been satisfactory, with extensive
criticism being leveled at two main points: 1) Kuhn's concept of a paradigm is ambiguous
in that it refers to so many aspects of the scientific process that his thesis is almost
nonfalsifiable; and 2) the concept is so vague that it is difficult to identify, in operational
terms, the specific paradigm of a discipline. Thus, Kuhn fails to specifically define what
constitutes a paradigm, and this is a point that Vasquez admits, as he specifies, "Kuhn has
not adequately resolved these problems," and for that reason, Vasquez aspires to provide
his own definition, as he asserts, "this analysis must provide its own stipulative
definition."117 In essence, Vasquez, observing the inadequacy of Kuhn's presentation of
the concept of paradigm, provides his own interpretation of what constitutes a definition
of a paradigm within a Kuhnian framework. Concomitantly, he "stipulatevily" defines the
concept of paradigm as "the fundamental assumptions scholars make about the world
they are studying."118
At this stage, it is quite clear that Vasquez's approach here is inherently problematic.
For one, the framework that he introduces is deemed problematic from the very
beginning, and he must resort to his own stipulative definitions so that he can
operationalize Kuhn's propositions. The extent to which Kuhn would agree with the
revision of his concept of paradigm is quite problematic and an issue that Vasquez does
not address. That is, the way Vasquez defines the concept of paradigm is not the same
way that Kuhn defines it. Vasquez's justification for this reformulation is the contention
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that in its existing definitional form, the concept cannot be properly applied and
operationalized in assessing international relations research programs. This, of course,
brings to light another serious problem: with these set of deficiencies, is the Kuhnian
model an acceptable framework for evaluating scientific inquiry within IR? More
specifically, if one rejects Kuhn's propositions, then Vasquez's underlying structure for
his critique self-destructs, since he has no foundations to base his argument on. It is for
this reason that Vasquez goes through the painstaking task of trying to convince the
reader that, regardless of its flaws and shortcomings, Kuhn's framework should still be
used. While this, clearly, is not convincing, we shall nonetheless accept Vasquez's plea
for the sake of argument and allow him to proceed.
Vasquez provides the following explanation for his stipulative definition:
The preceding definition has been stipulated to distinguish a
Paradigm from a conceptual framework or theory...A paradigm
consists of a set of fundamental assumptions of the world.
These assumptions focus the attention of the scholar on certain
phenomena and interpret those phenomena via concepts.
Propositions, in turn, are developed by specifying relationships
between concepts. Finally, theories are developed by specifying
relationships between propositions.119
Based on this epistemological structure, Vasquez concludes that a paradigm could
give rise to more than one theory, for new concepts, propositions, or theories that do not
change the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm do not constitute a new paradigm.
Vasquez's proposed epistemology of a paradigm is problematic for several reasons. First,
clarifying what the fundamental assumptions of a given paradigm are within IR is both
debatable and unclear. Second, there is no set criteria as to what constitutes a
fundamental assumption and what constitutes a conceptual or theoretical framework. The
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givenness of a certain phenomena, for example, could be deemed a fundamental
assumption, but within the structuration and context of a research program, that same
presumed fundamental assumption may be deemed a theoretical framework. And third, it
leads to an oversimplification of a given research program, for it reduces general and
complex elements of a school of thought to a narrow set of fundamental assumptions for
the sake of operationalization. Furthermore, Vasquez does not adequately explain how a
given theoretical framework cannot be deemed a fundamental assumption, since the
given assumption must be developed within a theoretical or conceptual structure. This
epistemological flaw in Vasquez's proposition will create further problems for him as he
attempts to classify and label what the fundamental assumptions of classical realism are.
Vasquez next shows Kuhn's description of how paradigms dominate a field and how
they are replaced. First, a single work, so unprecedented in its achievement, becomes a
paradigm because it becomes an exemplar of scientific analysis within its particular field.
Second, once a paradigm dominates, it is referred to as normal science, where theory
construction, fact gathering and research are guided by the fundamental assumption of
the paradigm. And third, normal science begins to come to an end when an anomaly, or
the recognition that nature has somehow violated the fundamental assumptions of the
paradigm, cannot be removed by paradigm articulation, leading to the rise of new
paradigms that could better account for the anomalies and the eventual supplanting of the
old paradigm by the new.120
While such scientific revolutions, or paradigm shifts, are not controversial, the
capacity of Kuhn to provide criteria for the evaluation of a given paradigm is. This is
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made more evident by Vasquez’s own assertion that "Kuhn provides little aid" with
respect to a set of criteria for evaluating paradigms.121 Vasquez offers two sets of criteria
for evaluating a paradigm which he claims, although there is much debate in the
philosophy of science over it, have a consensus. First, since a paradigm produces
theories, it is possible to evaluate the adequacy of a paradigm in terms of the corroborated
hypotheses it produces. Second, a paradigm, as science, must produce knowledge. And
herein lies another problem that Vasquez admits, and one that Lakatos points out: such
questions as to how many corroborated hypotheses, or how much paradigm-directed
research must be there in order for the set criteria to be deemed acceptable, "are
unanswerable questions in the field of international relations."122
Vasquez, once again, admits to the shortcomings of a given proposition (the criteria
through which a paradigm is to be evaluated), but then proceeds with it. In short, his
proposed criteria itself need a set of criteria, and it is one which he admits he is unable to
provide. And so if the criterion for evaluating a paradigm is the corroboration of
hypotheses, the criteria for selecting the quantity and quality of the paradigm-produced
hypotheses is unattainable, as Vasquez himself admits. With such being the case, one
could argue the very criteria that Vasquez proposes disqualifies itself, since his entire
proposition of this given criteria becomes a subject of intense contention. With respect to
the second criteria of science producing knowledge, Vasquez once again fails to do two
things. First, he does not clarify what constitutes produced knowledge. Second, he fails to
establish what is the criteria that determines whether a set of produced conclusions are
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deemed new knowledge or the regurgitation of existing knowledge. The lack of
satisfactory answers to these complications suggests a severe problem in Vasquez’s
research design.
To proceed with his attempt at characterizing realism as a degenerative paradigm
within the Kuhnian model, Vasquez first seeks to establish that realism has in fact been
the most dominant paradigm in the study of IR until the 1970’s. Vasquez’s approach here
is quite obvious, in that by proving that realism has been the dominant paradigm in the
discipline, he can lay the foundations for a potential scientific revolution. Moreover, an
attempt at a paradigm shift could be undertaken if he can demonstrate that the dominant
paradigm is degenerative. In order for Vasquez to be able to do this, he must prove the
following three propositions to be true. First, he must show that the realist paradigm has
guided theory construction in the field of international relations in the decades following
its inception. Second, he needs to demonstrate that the realist paradigm has guided data
making during the same time period. Lastly, Vasquez has to establish that the realist
paradigm has guided research in the field of international relations also during that same
time period. As Vasquez explains:
These three propositions specify much more clearly the spatialtemporal domain of the major proposition and what is meant by
the realist paradigm ‘dominating’ international relations inquiry.
Since the essential activities of any science are theory construction,
data making, and research, it can be concluded that if the realist
paradigm guides these three activities, then it is dominating
international relations inquiry.123
As initially specified, Vasquez defines a paradigm within the Kuhnian model, where
paradigm is understood as the given school of thought’s fundamental assumptions about
the world. Furthermore, Vasquez asserts that a “fundamental assumption is one that
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forms the foundation upon which the entire edifice of a discipline is built.”124 Based on
this underlying logical structure, Vasquez defines the paradigm of realism to be founded
upon three fundamental assumptions. The first assumption is that nation-states are the
most important actors for understanding international relations. Second, according to
realism there is a sharp distinction between domestic politics and international politics.
And third, realism asserts “that international relations is the struggle for power and
peace.”125 This oversimplification, and even misreading of classical realism, plays an
important role in Vasquez’s research design, since his research design is based on
proving the above three propositions to be true (that realism led the field in theory
construction, data gathering, and research guidance). In this sense, Vasquez simply
deems any scholar, regardless of the extent to which he or she somehow appeals to these
three fundamental assumptions, to be a realist. Vasquez considers those scholars as
realists who have been “providing alternative concepts and explanations that, while at
times very different from those employed by Morgenthau, are still with few exceptions
consistent with the three fundamental assumptions.”126
Not only is Vasquez’ classification of what constitutes a realist unacceptable and
problematic, it is also potentially devastating to his final critique. This is, since he is
including a plethora of scholars into the realist camp who are not classical realists.
Therefore, as it will be seen, when he aspires to critique realist scholarship and the
paradigm itself, this criticism becomes inherently questionable, since the criteria through
which he defines the paradigm is fundamentally flawed and oversimplified. More simply,
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Vasquez appears to argue that anyone and anything could be deemed part of the realist
paradigm as long as they are somehow connected to what he defines as the three
fundamental assumptions of realism, regardless of the fact that such perspectives could
be completely antithetical to or “very different” from the fundamental assumptions
articulated by Morgenthau. It then becomes a question of whether Vasquez is justifying
revisionist scholarship as an extension of realism itself, only later to use it as a method of
falsifying the paradigm, or is Vasquez accepting the ammunition provided by the
revisionist/non-realists, in which case he only has to pull the trigger and deem the
paradigm degenerative?
Whatever Vasquez’s approach, there are three structural problems with his critique.
First, Vasquez’s categorization of the three fundamental assumptions that define the
paradigm of classical realism is oversimplified, misleading, and underdeveloped. Owing
to this initial problem, Vasquez’s attempt at critiquing the scholarship undertaken by
realists becomes baseless, since his foundation of defining what constitutes a realist is
flawed. Put differently, he deems criticism of scholarship, which this thesis does not
recognize as realist, to be a critique of the paradigm itself. Lastly, Vasquez’s definition of
the realist paradigm does not meet the philosophical-theoretical framework of classical
realism presented in this thesis.

An Inadequate Epistemological Structure: Vasquez’s Problem of Defining Realism
The method through which this section will demonstrate the problem of Vasquez’s
definition of the realist paradigm will be two-fold. First, the structural flaw in Vasquez’s
epistemological framework of formulating the three fundamental assumptions that define
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the realist paradigm will be explored. Then, five additional fundamental assumptions of
classical realism will be discussed, through which the oversimplification, misreading, and
underdevelopment present in Vasquez’s framework will be shown.127
The fundamental problem in Vasquez’s epistemological framework is his formulation
of what constitutes a fundamental assumption. Vasquez asserts that not all “assumptions
are fundamental assumptions,” and he argues that Morgenthau’s assumption, for
example, “that the balance of power can sometimes be a useful mechanism for
maintaining peace is not a fundamental assumption, because it rests on a certain prior
assumption,” that only “nations can balance power.”128 Vasquez’s introduction and
implementation of the concept of prior assumption provides a potential problem in both
his framework and logical structure. His usage of the concept of prior assumption in
explaining and justifying why the balance of power concept cannot be deemed a
fundamental assumption is very unconvincing, since it poses a similar problem to his
proposed first fundamental assumption: that nation-states are the most important actors in
understanding international relations.
Since prior assumption serves as a necessary epistemic criterion with respect to
accepting or negating what constitutes a fundamental assumption, Vasquez undercuts his
own proposition by presuming the givenness of the nation-state, since the nation-state
itself rests on a “prior assumption.” If nation-states act in accordance to their interests, is
not the concept of the interest of the state a prior assumption on which its actions rest? As
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the most important actors, are nation-states not defined by their interests, and as such, is
not the “fundamental assumption” of the nation-state as the most important actor hinged
on the “prior assumption” of its very interests that define its importance? In Chapter 4, it
was demonstrated that the interests of the state are undoubtedly the ultimate ends of the
state, for the state’s very existence is defined by properly understanding what are its
interests. Accordingly, the dialectical process that allows for such realization is vital to
the very development of interest, for a state’s interest is not the byproduct of a simple
decision by a specific leader or a group of leaders, but rather an extensive dialectical
process that engulfs the entire state. From tactics and strategy, to policy formulation and
action, to the realization of what the state’s interests are, the state and its institutions and
functional mechanisms become overwhelmed and are dictated by the dialectical process.
To this end, the importance of nation-states as international actors is defined as, and
rested on, the prior assumption of the interests of the given state. For this reason, the
method through which Vasquez disqualifies balance of power as a fundamental
assumption, his own conception of the nation-state as the most important actor could also
be disqualified as a fundamental assumption.
Vasquez faces a similar problem with respect to his epistemological framework’s
formulation of what constitutes a fundamental assumption when presenting what he
maintains to be the second fundamental assumption of the realist paradigm: the
distinction between domestic and international politics. In order for a fundamental
assumption to be deemed as such, it must rest upon its very own fundaments, and must
thus be free of prior assumptions, for the very presence of prior assumptions negates the
capacity of an assumption to be a fundamental assumption. This being the criteria
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through which Vasquez qualifies what a fundamental assumption is, he must then be able
to account for the claim that the assumption that domestic politics are distinct from
international politics is not rested on a prior assumption. This, however, becomes
problematic for Vasquez, when he explores Morganthau’s underlying assumption as to
why domestic politics is distinct from international politics: “Morgenthau points
out…that it is specifically the decentralized or anarchic system of international society
that makes domestic politics different from international politics.”129 Similar to
Vasquez’s rejection of balance of power being a fundamental assumption, his own
proposition also becomes a subject of contention, since the assumption that domestic
politics is distinct from international politics rests on the prior assumption that the
international political system is anarchic. Could it then not be claimed that the
assumption the international political system is anarchic is a fundamental assumption?
Since Vasquez’s proposition of a fundamental assumption rests on a prior assumption,
this brings into question his own epistemological framework. In essence, Vasquez is
presented with a question that is quite devastating to the overarching structure of his
argument: what is a fundamental assumption, the international system is anarchic, or the
distinction between domestic and international politics? Which assumption is a
fundamental assumption, which assumption is a prior assumption, and which assumption
is merely just an assumption, a conceptual framework that “forms the foundation upon
which the entire edifice of a discipline is build?” Vasquez leaves such questions
unanswered, which raises questions about the theoretical structuration of Vasquez’s
argument.
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Vasquez’s presentation of the third assumption, that international politics is a struggle
for power and peace, is the only fundamental assumption within his epistemological
framework that is not completely problematic. Since the struggle for power is a
fundamental assumption of the paradigm that does not rest on a prior assumption, there
are no structural problems with this proposition. Vasquez, however, does not attempt to
specify or define the concept of power within the realist paradigm. As such, he presumes
any reference to war, conflict, or the use of arms to be an extension of the realist power
framework. However, Chapter 4 demonstrated that the realist concept of power is not
only a conceptual framework that is developed dialectically, but it includes vital
components ranging from human nature, to brute force, to state and universal morality.
For this reason, a scholar’s appeal to a power framework does not necessarily qualify
such a scholar to be classified as a realist, since the criteria of what constitutes a realist
framework vastly differs from what many perceive to be a fundamental assumption of the
paradigm. The complex structure of the power framework and the process through which
it comes into being, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, provide for a more specific
understanding of what the concept of power means within the paradigm. Furthermore,
this makes the implementation and the potential operationalization of the concept within
a research design more parsimonious, since the concept can no longer be deemed vague
and thus open to interpretations. As such, the dialectical development of power within the
philosophical and theoretical structure of the paradigm presents serious problems for
Vasquez, for it necessitates a more stringent and parsimonious criteria through which the
power framework is defined.
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As specified previously, this thesis does not contend that the three above-mentioned
fundamental assumptions are contradictory to the fundamental assumptions that the
paradigm makes about the world. The problem lies in Vasquez’s justification of what
constitutes a fundamental assumption. Furthermore, Vasquez’s implementation of a
conceptually flawed criteria (the concept of prior assumptions) is intended to exclude or
disqualify other realist assumptions from being deemed fundamental assumptions. While
the result of the criteria produces the opposite effect, it becomes a subject of contention
as to why Vasquez excludes five other fundamental assumptions that the realist paradigm
makes about the world. As such, while Vasquez uses, inconsistently, three fundamental
assumptions to define what constitutes a realist, the exclusion of the other five
fundamental assumptions of the paradigm undermines Vasquez’s argument. More
specifically, Vasquez contends that if a scholar appeals to the three fundamental
assumptions of the paradigm, that scholar is considered a realist.130 This thesis, however,
rejects this criteria of what constitutes a realist, and contends that if a scholar is to be
deemed a realist, then all eight fundamental assumptions of the paradigm, as laid out by
Morgenthau, must be accepted. Not only does this enrich the understanding of what
constitutes a realist, but it also makes the research design more parsimonious. That is, the
three fundamental assumptions presented by Vasquez are such oversimplifications of the
paradigm that almost any scholar who has had some affinity with power politics could be
deemed a realist. To thoroughly reject and demonstrate the misleading nature of such
criteria, five additional fundamental assumptions of the realist paradigm are presented
below. In short, this will show that Vasquez’s argument is at times contradictory and
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exhibits a misunderstanding of the theoretical and philosophical structure of the realist
school of thought.
The first fundamental assumption that Morgenthau makes, which is in essence an
epistemological presupposition, is that realism rejects systematized abstraction in favor of
practical, pragmatic assessments of the empirical world, for “to reduce international
relations to a system of abstract propositions with a predictive function” is not
acceptable.131 The second fundamental assumption is specified by Morgenthau’s
definition of what is the theory of realism: that “[t]he theoretical concern with human
nature as it actually is, and with the historic processes as they actually take place, has
earned for the theory presented here the name of realism.”132 The third fundamental
assumption is that realism assumes that political actors act and think in terms of interest
defined as power.133 The fourth fundamental assumption is that there is a relationship
between morality and political action.134 The fifth fundamental assumption is that
realism is different from “other schools of thought,” and this difference is both “real” and
“profound,” for realism constitutes a distinct intellectual approach and “parts company
with other schools when they impose standards of thought appropriate to other spheres
upon the political sphere.”135
Along with the three assumptions presented by Vasquez, the five additional
assumptions presented in this section provide for the eight fundamental assumptions that
define the realist paradigm. For Vasquez to include only three of the fundamental
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assumptions, while providing no convincing justification for having done so, presents a
problem for his research design. In sum, the accusation of oversimplification presented
by this thesis becomes even more evident when the following questions are brought to
light. Why does Vasquez refrain from addressing two of the fundamental assumptions
that deal with the epistemological framework of the paradigm (rejection of both
systematized abstraction and the interjection of external standards of thought upon the
realist framework)? How are the third and fourth assumptions presented above any
different from the three presented by Vasquez with respect to being deemed as a
fundamental assumption? How is the assumption that realism assumes that political
actors act and think in terms of interest defined as power not a fundamental assumption,
but the assumption international politics is distinct from domestic politics is a
fundamental assumption? Why is the assumption that a deep-seated relationship exists
between morality and political action disqualified as a fundamental assumption? Is this
not a fundamental assumption that realist “scholars make about the world they are
studying?”136 How is any of the five additional fundamental assumptions not a
fundamental assumption that scholars of the realist paradigm make about the world that
they are studying? Could it then not be concluded that Vasquez’s rejection of the five
realist fundamental assumptions oversimplifies his assessment of the paradigm, and as
such, raises doubt about his criteria of what constitutes a realist scholar?
The intent here is to demonstrate that Vasquez’s oversimplification of the paradigm is
based on his misunderstanding of the philosophical and theoretical structuration of
classical realism. More specifically, Vasquez fails to grasp the underlying
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epistemological framework of the paradigm, which not only demonstrates the dialectical
development of the paradigm’s core concepts, but also the fact that the set of fundamental
assumptions that define the paradigm are structurally tied to one another. The concept of
interest defined in terms of power, as a fundamental assumption, for example, is
intricately tied to the fundamental assumption that international relations is the struggle
for power and peace. By disqualifying the former, one is, by the very structuration of the
paradigm’s epistemological framework, questioning the legitimacy of the latter as a
fundamental assumption. In assessing the concept of interest defined in terms of power, it
was demonstrated in the previous chapter that this fundamental assumption incorporates a
multitude of realist assumptions into its framework, through which they dialectically
evolve into a final synthesis: interest defined in terms of power. As such, when
addressing the fundamental assumption that international relations is the struggle for
power and peace, then by the very standards of the paradigm, one is also addressing the
fundamental assumption of interest defined in terms of power, since it is in the interests
of the state to struggle for power and peace, for this interest is defined in terms of the
very power for which the state struggles. Furthermore, one is confronted with the
fundamental assumption that a deep-seethed relationship exists between morality and
political action. This relationship is intrinsically tied to the struggle for power and peace,
since power, at its highest developed stage, is synthesized with morality, while political
action, defined by the developed interests of the state, is shaped by its moral
consequences. It clearly is no coincidence that the set fundamental assumptions of the
paradigm established by Morganthau are directly related to the dialectical model
provided in this thesis. Vasquez’s inability to observe and detect such conceptual
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structures within the paradigm’s philosophical and theoretical framework is the primary
reason why his assessment of the paradigm is underdeveloped and oversimplified. In
light of such assessments, Vasquez’s assertion that the qualification for being deemed a
realist is defined by only subscribing to the three fundamental assumptions provided in
his research design misrepresents the paradigm’s standard of what constitutes a realist.
Not only does Vasquez’s misunderstanding of realism lead to an oversimplification of
the paradigm, but it also provides, perhaps inadvertently, an acceptance of revisionism. In
addressing the process of theory construction, or paradigm articulation, Vasquez
maintains, “New conceptual frameworks, even if brought in from sister disciplines, may
not necessarily contradict the assumptions of the dominant paradigm and are adapted if
they do. Thus, while new frameworks like decision making, systems analysis, game
theory, and cybernetics constitute breaks with the power politics framework, they don not
necessarily reject the three fundamental assumptions of the realist paradigm.”137 A new
conceptual framework, in its very structuration, must be based upon the philosophicaltheoretical framework and the fundamental assumptions of the given paradigm. As such,
the very suggestion that a new framework may be “brought in from sister disciplines” is
not only a clear violation of one of realism’s fundamental assumptions, but also a
complete misunderstanding of theory formulation within the paradigm. The fifth
fundamental assumption discussed above—which holds that realism is different from
other schools of thought in its distinct intellectual approach and that it decisively parts
company with other schools when such schools impose standards of thought from
external spheres upon the political sphere—demonstrates the misunderstanding that
Vasquez has of the realist paradigm. Realism’s rejection of interjecting conceptual
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frameworks from external disciplines is extensively discussed by Morgenthau, “The
realist defense of the autonomy of the political sphere against its subversion by other
modes of thought does not imply disregard for the existence and importance of these
other modes of thought,” but “rather implies that each should be assigned its proper
sphere of function.”138 Vasquez fails to understand that “sister disciplines,” while not
disregarded by realism, are deemed subversive and excluded from the paradigm’s theory
construction process.
Vasquez is presented with another problem when he argues that if the new conceptual
frameworks “contradict the assumptions of the dominant paradigm,” they could be
“adapted” as a mechanism of either concealing or reconciling the contradiction. The mere
insinuation of adaptation clearly advocates a revisionist framework, for the very act of
adapting a conceptual framework from a sister discipline that contradicts the fundamental
assumptions of realism into the paradigm necessitates the alteration, reconstruction, and
revision of the contradictory conceptual framework. In more simple terms, Vasquez is
suggesting that if a conceptual framework does not fit into the realist model, it is
acceptable to engage in revisionism as a mechanism of alleviating such a problem. This is
why Vasquez has no problems accepting all of the neo-paradigms that are at the
periphery as being realist, even though all the acts of interjecting external conceptual
frameworks into the paradigm are categorically rejected by the paradigm’s fundamental
assumptions.
While Vasquez’s consistent violation of realism’s fundamental assumptions is
contributed to his misunderstanding of realism, his following statement suggests a
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disregard for what realism stands for: “Thus, while new frameworks…constitute breaks
with the power politics framework, they do not necessarily reject the three fundamental
assumptions of the realist paradigm.” Power politics defines the very structuration of the
various fundamental assumptions of the paradigm, and as discussed above, the
fundamental assumptions of the paradigm are intricately and intrinsically tied to one
another. As such, a break with the power politics framework is a break with several of the
paradigm’s fundamental assumptions, including the limited three assumptions that
Vasquez presents. For Vasquez to assert that “they do not necessarily reject
the…fundamental assumptions of the realist paradigm” is quite mind-boggling.139 At this
stage the internal contradiction within Vasquez’s assessment undermines the foundation
of his entire argument.

Evaluating the Adequacy of the Realist Paradigm: Disputing Vasquez’s Criteria
After demonstrating that the realist paradigm has dominated the field of international
relations in the decades following its inception, and further attempting to demonstrate
what the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm are, Vasquez concludes his argument
by attempting to demonstrate that realism has failed to satisfy the most important criteria
that evaluates a paradigm’s status as being progressive or degenerative: the ability to
produce knowledge.140 Vasquez asserts that three specific criteria may be used to
evaluate whether a “paradigm has produced any knowledge.”141 First is the “criterion of
139

Decision making, systems analysis, game theory, and cybernetics are transdisciplinary, interdisciplinary,
and multiperspectival approaches that primarily suggest the introduction of methodological approaches,
and as such, they are not a subject of contention with respect to this critique of Vasquez. The problem lies
in Vasquez’s claim that a violation of the power politics framework, which is itself a fundamental
assumption within the paradigm, is both conceivable and acceptable.
140
Ibid., pg. 173.
141
Ibid., pg. 174.

103

accuracy,” which maintains that the evaluation of a paradigm’s produced knowledge
could be determined by “examining the empirical content of its theories, that is, the
number of hypotheses that have failed to be falsified.”142 Since a given paradigm’s
hypotheses attempt to provide the most accurate prediction of behavior, a falsification of
such hypotheses suggests disqualification of a paradigm’s predictive and explanatory
powers. The second is the “criterion of centrality,” which holds that “a paradigm’s central
propositions must fail to be falsified when tested.”143 The logic for this criterion is based
on the assumption that “the central propositions form the heart of the theory,” and if
falsified, then the hard core of the paradigm collapses. The third and final criteria, the
“criterion of scientific importance,” holds that the knowledge produced by a given
paradigm must be of “some value.” This, however, is the most controversial criterion, for
Vasquez concedes that “a number of secondary criteria could be provided to assess the
value of the produced knowledge, but there is not much consensus in the field over what
those criteria might be.” Such being the case, Vasquez presents his own criteria, “that the
knowledge should be nonobvious to a large segment of scholars in the field.”144
In order to determine the extent to which the realist paradigm has satisfied the three
criteria of paradigm adequacy, Vasquez attempts to test the following three propositions.
First, the realist paradigm should tend to produce hypotheses that fail to be falsified
(criterion of accuracy). Second, the central propositions of the realist paradigm should
tend to produce hypotheses that fail to be falsified (criterion of centrality). And third,
realist hypotheses that fail to be falsified should be of scientific importance (criterion of
scientific importance). If these propositions “fail to be falsified, then it can be concluded
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that the realist paradigm has been an adequate guide to scientific international relations
inquiry.” If, however, these propositions are falsified, “then the claim that the realist
paradigm was not very effective in explaining behavior will be given credence.”145 The
logic of Vasquez’s design is based on the assumption that if the three provided criteria, in
conjunction with the testing of the three above-mentioned propositions, could
demonstrate that realism has failed to produce knowledge in the field of international
relations, then realism as a paradigm could be deemed degenerative. The ability of
Vasquez to prove his claim is based on the applicability and the structural consistency of
each of the criteria. This being the case, if it could be demonstrated that the proposed
criteria are structurally inconsistent and unreliable, then their capacity to serve as agents
of evaluating a paradigm’s adequacy is disqualified. Once this is established, the
evaluation method which defines Vasquez’s research design and justifies his final
conclusion becomes negated, since the criteria by which realism is evaluated become
dubious, ad hoc, and unreliable.
In dealing with the first proposition (criterion of accuracy), Vasquez is immediately
faced with a complication, and one which he concedes: “no decision-rule has been
provided for determining how many hypotheses must be falsified before a paradigm can
be declared to have inadequately satisfied the criterion of accuracy.”146 This being the
case, Vasquez resorts to an ad hoc decision-rule: the Lakatosian requirement that a
theory’s adequacy can be evaluated by comparing the empirical content of one theory
with the empirical content of a rival theory. Even after resorting to this ad hoc decision
rule, Vasquez is once again presented with another problem; namely, there is not a single

144
145

Ibid., pg. 174.
Ibid., pg. 175.

105

theory in the field that realism can be tested against. Vasquez’s solution is a further
revision of the ad hoc decision rule: every “nonrealist” hypothesis in the field of
international relations will be tested against realism. These “nonrealist” hypotheses are
defined as sharing “a common characteristic of ‘not being realist,’ but they do not share a
well-defined rival paradigm.”147
The structural design of the criterion of accuracy suffers from a vagueness that
completely limits its capacity for proper operationalization. This being the case,
Vasquez’s approach at operationalizing the first proposition not only makes the structural
design of this criteria even more problematic, but also contradicts its very structure. Since
an accepted decision-rule does not exist by which the implementation of this criterion
could be legitimated, what allows Vasquez to conclude that an ad hoc decision-rule is
justifiable? The absence of a decision-rule suggests that the criterion could not be applied
without controversy, since a multitude of variables could be used to reject the outcome of
the tested proposition. Realizing that this problem cannot be escaped, Vasquez interjects
the Lakatosian assumption. While the Lakatosian assumption, by itself, is not
problematic, its ad hoc implementation is. Vasquez does not provide a justification as to
how Lakatos’ requirement is adequate in assessing the criterion of accuracy. Even if
Lakatos’ standard is implemented, which “empirical contents” of a theory are to be
compared? How many hypotheses from each theory are to be compared and falsified to
satisfy the capacity of the criterion of accuracy to evaluate the adequacy of a paradigm?
Vasquez fails to answer such questions.
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The most problematic aspect of Vasquez’s approach is the revision of the ad hoc
decision-rule, which is quite puzzling. Not only does Vasquez resort to an ad hoc
approach, which immediately questions the consistency of his proposition, but he also
revises the very ad hoc decision-rule that he initially implemented to revise the structure
of testing the number of hypotheses. It appears that whenever his proposed method within
a criterion becomes inadequate, he simply alters it to favor his research design. Unable to
meet Lakatos’ standard of comparing two research designs, Vasquez decides to compare
a single paradigm against the entire field. Not only is such an approach questionable, but
it is unfair and ad hoc. If realism cannot be compared with another paradigm, then
Lakotos’ standard becomes inapplicable, since Lakatos does not provide for ad hoc
modifications. Furthermore, what consitutes a “nonrealist?” How are scholars that are on
the periphery categorized? Vasquez’s definition of what constitutes a realist vastly differs
from that of this thesis, and as such, what one scholar defines as realist differs from
another scholar. This being the case, what is to be done with theories that have some
fusion of realist assumptions, but at the same time use “nonrealist” principles?148 Is not
the criterion of accuracy so convoluted, vague, and contradictory that its application to
the process of evaluating a paradigm’s adequacy be disqualified? The operationalization
of a criterion that is ad hoc and structurally inconsistent provides for the nullification of
the conclusion produced by the criteria. For this reason, the application of the criterion of
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accuracy to evaluate the adequacy of the realist paradigm becomes inapplicable, for the
produced results of the criterion are disqualified by virtue of internal complications.
Vasquez’s treatment of the criterion of centrality is less problematic with respect to
its capacity for operationalization, but more problematic with respect to its understanding
of realism. The objective of this second criterion is to test the falsifiability of the
paradigm’s central propositions. The controversy in this instance revolves around the
question of what constitutes the central propositions of the realist paradigm? As discussed
earlier in this chapter, Vasquez’s inability to differentiate and properly define what
constitutes an assumption, a fundamental assumption, a concept, or in this case, a central
proposition, proves to be detrimental to the epistemological structuration of his argument.
In addressing the criterion of accuracy, Vasquez holds that the balance of power, national
power, and war are the central propositions of the realist paradigm. Central propositions
are defined as being more important, or having more value, in relation to other
propositions in the paradigm.149 Based on this supposition, it becomes difficult to assess
how balance of power, for example, is more important, or has more value, than
diplomacy? Or, how diplomacy is not considered a central proposition, since balance of
power, to a strong extent, is preserved though diplomacy, while at the same time national
power, another central proposition, is projected by the machinations of diplomacy?
Furthermore, war, as a concept in realist theory, is not necessarily a proposition, but
rather a natural byproduct of human nature. More specifically, war is an outcome, an
event, a consequence, not a conceptual framework. Vasquez’s application of war as a
central proposition is both murky and confusing.
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More problematic, however, is Vasquez’s coding in the research design of what
constitutes the central hypotheses in the realist paradigm: national power and
international alliances. Specifically, “national power variables” and “alliance variables”
are coded as the “central hypotheses in the realist paradigm.”150 To narrow the vast and
complex theoretical presuppositions and core propositions of the paradigm to two
frameworks is a complete oversimplification of what constitutes the central propositions
of the paradigm. Basically, Vasquez tests the falsifiablity of two concepts to evaluate
whether or not the entire paradigm of realism is adequate. While the research design and
its methodological structuration are not problematic, Vasquez’s conceptualization of
which propositions to test is. For example, as expected, Vasquez concludes that the
national power variable and alliance variables fail to predict and provide explanatory
power for the behavior of international actors.151 This, however, cannot be deemed
surprising, since so many variables and core concepts are left out, that the capacity of two
limited propositions to explain international behavior is not sufficient. For Vasquez to
consistently separate concepts and propositions from their contexts, that is, from their
interrelations, for the sake of operationalizing and testing these propositions is quite
misleading. A great many hypotheses, for example, that include other central propositions
that happened to be left out of the research design because of Vasquez’s misguided
criteria could not have been falsified. Fundamentally, the tested variables in Vasquez’s
research design are not complete and acceptable representations of the realist paradigm.
The third and final criteria of evaluating the adequacy of realism is the criterion of
scientific importance, which “maintains that knowledge produced by the paradigm should
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not be trivial; that is, the produced knowledge should not be considered obvious or trivial
to most scholars in the field.”152 If a criterion is subjective, vague, or subject to various
different interpretations, then it loses both its parsimoniousness and its value as a
standard of evaluation. The criterion of scientific importance suffers from this exact
problem, for three immediate questions arise from Vasquez’s conceptualization of the
criterion. First, what method of inquiry is to be used to determine if a produced
knowledge is obvious, specifically, what constitutes obviousness? Second, how is
triviality defined and measured? And finally, how is a consensus formed whether a
produced knowledge is obvious, somewhat obvious, completely trivial, or partially
trivial? While Vasquez provides no satisfactory answers to these questions, he does admit
awareness of this problem, because “triviality is more subject to personal interpretation
than other matters,” since the “criterion of scientific importance is very difficult to
operationalize and measure.”153
Vasquez’s solution to this “very difficult” problem is not only ad hoc, but highly
subjective, since it is not based on the scientific method of inquiry: “the author has
simply coded major findings as either trivial or nontrivial according to his own
assessment of ‘importance.’”154 To establish the evaluation of the major findings of the
realist paradigm on a scholar’s personal notion of “importance,” and not on an acceptable
scientific and methodological standard, is to produce results that are highly questionable.
This being the case, Vasquez appears to be arguing that what constitutes scientifically
important knowledge is his opinion. For this reason, the findings of Vasquez’s research
design become quite irrelevant, since they are established on subjective and non-scientific
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grounds. To reject the major findings of a dominant paradigm as trivial and inadequate
based on personal assessments is tantamount to rejecting the method of scientific inquiry
that guides knowledge accumulation in the field of international relations. Ironically,
Vasquez ends up contradicting the very thing which he seeks to advocate: the objective
and epistemic value of scientifically produced knowledge.

Conclusion
The breadth and scope of Vasquez’s research design are both extensive and
impressive. His exploration of the vast literature over the decades following the inception
of realism is valuable, as is his assessment of the extent to which realism dominated the
field of international relations within the standards of philosophy of science. The
underlying problem with Vasquez, however, is not specifically his research design or his
assessment of the paradigm’s role in the field, but rather his understanding of realism as a
political philosophy. As a result of such misunderstandings, Vasquez’s research design
produced variables that misrepresented the subject of study, defined concepts through a
misreading of these concepts, and hence produced epistemological and analytical
frameworks that were structurally problematic and inapplicable.
Vasquez’s assessments of the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm, for example,
are oversimplified and incomplete. These oversimplified and incomplete assessments
provided for a definition of what constitutes a realist to be deemed questionable and
controversial. At the same time, Vasquez suffered from a set of problems with respect to
his epistemological framework, since his concepts of assumptions, fundamental
assumptions, and previous assumptions were underdeveloped and damaging to the logical
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structure of his argument. This inevitably resulted in a complete misunderstanding of the
intrinsic and intricate nature of the set of fundamental principles and assumptions that
defined the paradigm. Finally, Vasquez’s three criteria of evaluating the adequacy of
realism proved to be unconvincing. As demonstrated, the proposed criteria were
structurally inconsistent, subjective, vague, and unreliable, thereby disqualifying
Vasquez’s claim that the realist paradigm is degenerative by virtue of its inability to
produce scientifically important knowledge.
Chapter 5 demonstrated that realism qualifies as the dominant paradigm in the field of
international relations. This dominance is attributed to three factors: that realism guided
the field of international relations in theory construction, data making, and research.
Namely, realism came to define the very study of international relations. Concomitantly,
an attempt was made by Vasquez to negate the continuation of this dominance by
demonstrating the paradigm to be degenerative. This attempt, however, proved to be
unsuccessful, as this chapter displayed the complications in Vasquez’s endeavor.
Alternately, what are the consequences of the set of conclusions reached in this chapter?
First, the attempt to falsify the underlying assumptions of the paradigm failed. Second,
the attempt to prove that the knowledge produced by the paradigm is inadequate failed.
And finally, the attempt to falsify the paradigm as degenerative failed by virtue of failing
to demonstrate that realism has failed to produce knowledge of value. Therefore, and in
conclusion, this thesis maintains that realism is a scientifically adequate approach for
explaining behavior in international relations.
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CHAPTER 6
THE REALIST PARADIGM IN MODERNITY: A CONCLUSION
The purpose of a paradigm is to provide guidance, structure, and parameters to the
study of a given field. By unambiguously connecting specific claims to core concepts and
fundamental assumptions, paradigms provide assistance in defining the scope and
strength of particular claims, assessing the paradigm’s explanatory powers, understanding
the relationship between theories and hypotheses, interpreting the implications of specific
findings, developing coherent explanations, and structuring social scientific discourse.
Realism’s long history and dominant position in the field of international relations has
guided the field in theory formulation, research guidance, data-collection, policy analysis,
and scientific inquiry. Realism is not just a theory, it is a constellation of theories
established on an epistemological structure that is guided by a philosophical framework.
This overarching model is the paradigm, the intricate structure of core concepts,
fundamental assumptions, conceptual frameworks, and analytical methodologies. By
virtue of its scope, depth, and structuration, classical realism is a complete paradigm in
the study of international relations.
The objective of this thesis has been five-fold. First, to introduce the reader to a
thorough assessment of the political philosophy of realism, defining and interpreting key
principles, concepts, and structures that define the paradigm. Second, to address the
problem of revisionism and the marginalization of classical realism, arguing for the
revival of the paradigm. Third, to introduce an original method of inquiry, via the
dialectical, to the study of the realist paradigm, providing for a new analytical approach
in exploring its scope and depth. Fourth, to demonstrate that the realist paradigm is both
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adequate and progressive within the standards of philosophy of science, arguing that the
misreading and misrepresentation of the paradigm is the primary reason why classical
realism has been misunderstood and foully critiqued. And five, to address the concerns of
whether the explanatory powers of the paradigm are capable of addressing the anomalies
of the modern international political system.
Chapter 2 introduced realism as a political philosophy of international relations,
exploring the structuration of the paradigm’s epistemological framework, along with an
assessment of the fundamental assumptions that define the paradigm. Paradigm-building,
as a theory oriented approach, was also addressed, providing for a consideration of the
guidelines of theory articulation within the paradigm. Chapter 2 then proceeded to
explore the conceptual, structural, and analytical framework of classical realism,
presenting an assessment of all the important components of the paradigm’s theoretical
model. This chapter introduced the reader to a comprehensive reading of the realist
paradigm, providing the foundations upon which the arguments in the following chapters
are established on.
The third chapter introduced the method through which classical realism has been
marginalized in international relations scholarship via revisionism. Revisionism is
exposed to demonstrate two things. First, realism’s explanatory power is so immense that
other research programs establish their foundations upon its political philosophy. Second,
the marginalization of classical realism has led to a misconception in the discipline that
the paradigm has either been supplanted by the new realist approaches, or that the new
realist approaches are the extensions of classical realism. The philosophical core and the
theoretical structure of the realist approach have been undermined by its own revisionist
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defenders, who have sought to address new anomalies by reformulating realism in forms
that are less coherent, less determinate, and less distinctive. This chapter demonstrated
that classical realism is a separate paradigm and quite distinct from the revisionist
research programs. It is for this reason that this thesis attempts to revive classical realism
as a scientifically oriented inquiry of international political behavior. In sum, Chapter 3
demonstrates to the reader how classical realism has been treated in modern scholarship,
engages and counters criticisms of classical realism, while demonstrating the currency of
the paradigm, and justifying the necessity for reviving classical realism.
Chapter 4 introduced an original method of inquiry that has never been used in the
study of classical realism as a political philosophy of international relations. This
analytical model allows for a more thorough assessment of the paradigm's fundamental
assumptions and its epistemic development via the dialectical. It is important to note that
the dialectical is an approach that Morgenthau appeals to several times in his formulation
of the realist philosophy, yet international relations scholars have failed to apply any
attention or scholarship to it. This chapter introduced this unique component of realism as
this thesis’ original contribution to the study of international relations.
Chapter five addresses one of the most devastating critiques leveled against the realist
paradigm, that realism is a degenerative paradigm by virtue of its regressive scientific
approach. Using Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science, John A. Vasquez offered a
powerful argument that the realist paradigm has failed to lead scientific inquiry and
knowledge accumulation within the field of international relations. Vasquez sought to
demonstrate that the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm lack explanatory and
predictive power and are thus falsified, leading to his conclusion that realism, as the most
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dominant paradigm in the post-WWII era, is degenerative. Concomitantly, this chapter
took issue with Vasquez’s critique, demonstrating the theoretical and analytical flaws in
Vasquez’s assessment of realism, arguing that Vasquez’s misreading and
misinterpretation of the paradigm’s fundamental principles are the underlying reason for
the critique. As such, Vasquez’s entire approach was deconstructed and scrutinized to
demonstrate that the realist paradigm, contrary to Vasquez’s evaluation, met the criteria
of a progressive paradigm.
This final chapter will address the role of the realist paradigm within the context of
modernity, providing a general outline of the paradigm’s explanatory powers and its
capacity to account for new anomalies. It will be demonstrated that from a theoretical
perspective, the core concepts, the fundamental assumptions, and the existing auxiliaries
of the paradigm are sufficient in accounting for the modern international political system.
From this theoretical assessment, further empirical research may be conducted in the
future that could both explain and predict behavior. By establishing the conceptual
arguments and theoretical guidelines of how classical realism addresses modernity,
further scientifically oriented research may be conducted to provide empirical evidence
for the paradigm’s claims and hypotheses.

Addressing Anomalies in the Modern International Political System: Realism’s Staying
Power
Classical realism is the oldest and most prominent paradigm in the study of
international relations. It is the primary, or at its minimal, the alternative theory in the
majority of the scholarship conducted in the field. Furthermore, the tools of the paradigm
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have led to the formulation of new research programs, midrange theories, and conceptual
frameworks for non-realist schools of thought. Realism retains a salient, and even,
dominant position in international relations theory because of its capacity to provide
plausible explanations for salient international phenomena. While many research
programs are born, or become degenerative, in response to accounting for new anomalies
in the international political system, realism only articulates or refines its existing core of
concepts and auxiliaries.
A paradigm’s capacity to deal with new anomalies is the underlying criteria by which
a paradigm is deemed either progressive or degenerative. If a paradigm is not able to
account for new anomalies and phenomena, then its explanatory powers become either
obsolete or inapplicable. More specifically, the assumptions that the paradigm makes
about the international system become inconsistent with the nature of that system,
hampering the tools of the paradigm from predicting or explaining behavior. In either
case, new paradigms with the capacity to account for new anomalies provide the grounds
for a scientific revolution: a paradigm shift. For example, idealism was supplanted as the
dominant paradigm by realism because of its incapacity to satisfactorily address a new
anomaly that questioned the fundamental assumptions of the paradigm, the Second World
War. When a paradigm’s fundamental assumptions, core concepts, and conceptual
models are not comprehensive enough to provide explanations for new anomalies, the
paradigm is faced with one other option: resorting to its auxiliaries. The use of
auxiliaries, however, makes the paradigm prone to both controversy and criticism if the
implementation of auxiliaries is not legitimated by two criteria: absence of ad hoc
explanations and connectedness.
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As initially specified, a paradigm must be logically coherent, in that it must not
contain internal logical contradictions that allow unambiguous derivations of
contradictory conclusions. The use of auxiliary assumptions to account for new
anomalies generally creates multiple and contradictory propositions if the auxiliaries are
ad hoc. Specifically, ad hoc explanations are immunization stratagems that are designed
to restrict the scope of theory exclusively for the purpose of saving it from confuting or
falsifying evidence. For this reason, ad hoc auxiliaries do not provide either explanations
or accountability for anomalies and therefore serve as multiple and differing assessments
that tend to contradict one another. If an auxiliary assumption is ad hoc, it both damages
the dependability of the paradigm and further contributes to its degeneration, since it
becomes counterproductive. As such, not only must auxiliaries be absent of an ad hoc
approach, but they also must meet the standard of connectedness. Theoretical
explanations of empirical findings within a paradigm that rely on auxiliary assumptions
must be connected to the paradigm’s core concepts and fundamental assumptions to
provide new explanations, predictions, or to clear up anomalies. If the auxiliary
assumptions are not connected to the fundamental principles of the given paradigm, then
the auxiliary assumption is contradictory to the paradigm’s epistemological structure. To
this end, when auxiliaries are used to account for anomalies, it is a necessary condition
that such auxiliaries are connected to and are extensions of the paradigm’s philosophical
framework. If the auxiliaries are ad hoc, or cannot be justified by the paradigm’s belief
system, then their applications to addressing new anomalies are questionable and
controversial. Therefore, auxiliaries that are not ad hoc, and are connected to the
paradigm’s philosophical framework, are by definition extensions of the paradigm’s core
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concepts and fundamental assumptions, for auxiliaries articulate and refine such concepts
and assumptions to account for specific anomalies. More simply, auxiliaries update the
paradigm with the changes brought forth by modernity.155
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the international political system of the modern age
differs from that of the previous ages, with new phenomena presenting anomalies for
paradigms to clear up and explain. The dialectical model demonstrated realism’s
dynamism as an evolving paradigm and its compatibility with the evolving and everchanging nature of the international political system as an extension of historic change.
Eras, or historic periods, are defined by changes in the structure of the international
system, interactions amongst actors (e.g. war, diplomatic relations, etc), realignment in
the balance of power, rise or fall of hemegon(s), and new developments that allow for the
identification of the new era. It is not the intent of this thesis to specify what criteria
constitute a change in a given historic period, or the birth of a new one. The intent,
however, is to demonstrate that different historic periods produce different international
phenomena as new anomalies that need new explanations and assessments. For example,
the nature of the international political system was vastly different during the Roman
Empire, the Renaissance, the post-Westphalia system, the World Wars, the Cold War,
and the modern system. Each era introduced its own set of complexities and new
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The following elaboration will be provided to allow for a better understanding of this process. The
concepts of diplomacy, alliance formulation, and international peace, for example, are concepts that are
part of the realist paradigm’s theoretical structure. As such, using these concepts to account for new
anomalies is both acceptable and consistent. These concepts, however, have never been used to account for
such phenomena as regionalism, integration, or the formation of supranational entities. This happens to be
the case because such phenomena did not exist in the past international system. For this reason, these
phenomena are considered to be new anomalies. Since diplomacy, alliances, and international peace, for
example, can be used to address these new anomalies, the structure through which they address these new
phenomena become auxiliary assumptions, for such assumptions have not existed in the past (since these
anomalies did note exist in the past). To this end, the implementation of such auxiliary assumptions is
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anomalies that did not exist in the previous era, and as such, a progressive paradigm must
display a staying power through which it is able to address a given era, or the start of a
new era. While certain axiomatic factors never change, as discussed in Chapter 2, new
and complicated variables do come into play that must be satisfactorily explained.
The post-Cold War international scene, labeled in this thesis as the modern age, is a
new historic period with its anomalies that the realist paradigm must demonstrate its
capacity to explain. Generally speaking, the post-bipolar international political system
has become dominated by the following new phenomena that did not exist in the previous
eras: the rise in international organizations and institutions (IGOs), the continued
integration of supranational entities, the evolving scope of regionalism, institutional
restraint,156 ascendancy of international law, and the spread of globalization.157 From a
theoretical perspective (which provides the justification for future empirical research),
three core concepts of the realist paradigm, articulated and refined as connected and nonad hoc auxiliary assumptions, explain and account for the new anomalies. All forms of
integration, cooperation, regionalism, restraint, and adherence to standards of
international law can be accounted for by three realist concepts: diplomacy, alliance, and
international peace.158 All such phenomena within modernity have come into being,

legitimate and acceptable because they are not ad hoc, and they are connected to and are extensions of the
realist paradigm’s philosophical structure.
156
The concept of institutional restraint is used in this thesis within the context of self-restraint, that is,
states choose to engage in self-restraint for the sake of preserving the given institutions, since such
institutions advance the interests of the state. It is not used in the neoliberal context, which holds that
institutions, as international regimes, limit the scope and actions of the state.
157
Compared to the past, the world has witnessed a decrease in inter-state conflict and an increase in
cooperation. This development, however, is ephemeral, for the world is witnessing the beginning stages of
the modern age, and one cannot presume the extent to which the conflict/cooperation variable will change
in the future.
158
For further discussion of these concepts, see Chapter 2 of this thesis, pp. 33-38.
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initially, through diplomacy, solidified through alliances, and maintained with
international peace.
International institutions, specifically intergovernmental organizations, while having
existed during and prior to the Cold War, have come to play a prominent role in
modernity. The United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the
World Health Organization (WHO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the
World Trade Organization (WTO) are few examples of IGOs whose roles have created
anomalies with respect to their relevance to the international political system. The ability
for international organizations to exist suggests extensive cooperation amongst member
states, a degree of institutional restraint, and an adherence to the attainment of some
notion of international peace. The restructuration of the international system following
the bipolar system has allowed for this phenomenon, supplemented by the fact that the
single hegemonic system (U.S. dominance) does not feel threatened by the presence of
such factors. Furthermore, the purpose of IGO’s is attainment of mutual goals, and since
the objectives of membership are defined by a certain sense of mutual gain, its
maintenance also serves a mutual interest.
Regional organizations, such as the European Union, the Asian Cooperation Dialogue
(ACD), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union, and the Organization of American
States (OAS), are also examples of intergovernmental organizations that promote
regional interests. Regional integration seeks to enhance economic and political
cooperation through regional institutions and rules. The purpose of regionalism is to
achieve broader socio-political, economic, and security objectives. The objectives

121

intergovernmental organizations are the attainment of mutual goals and the preservations
of such designs. The European Union, however, has moved somewhat beyond an
intergovernmental approach to a supra-national level of decision-making:
supranationalism. It is the most regionally integrated area in the world, since its
integration has not only been horizontal, but has also been vertical, allowing for deeper
integration between the member states.
Since in the past the world has not seen such levels of integration, interaction, and
cooperation that affect the international system, they become anomalies that necessitate
explanations. These new anomalies, however, have not altered the axiomatic assumptions
that define the existing nature of the international system. More specifically, the
agent/actor structure has not been altered or supplanted, since the state remains the unit of
analysis, and all other developments are the extensions of the behavior of the state. The
anarchic nature of the international system remains intact, for neither intergovernmental
organizations, nor their stipulation of institutional restraint, constitutes an absolute and
independent form of hierarchic structuration of authority in the international system.
Also, as it will be demonstrated, the formation of international institutions,
intergovernmental organizations, and regional integration is best explained by one of the
fundamental assumptions of realism: interest defined in terms of power.
As discussed in Chapter 2, classical realism contemplates a world composed of
integrated societies if the structure of the international system allows it.159 Since realism
does not negate the formulation of an integrated international society, but rather views it
extremely beneficial if it may be attained, its theoretical structure becomes both adequate
and sufficient in accounting for international phenomena that create a more integrated,
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cooperative world.160 Tied to this underlying theoretical premise are the three core
concepts—diplomacy, alliances, and international peace—that further explain and
address the new anomalies of the international system. All international organizations and
institutions initially come into being through diplomacy. Diplomatic relations between
states provide the necessary conditions for states to engage in a discourse regarding the
benefits or necessities of forming intergovernmental organizations. Realism defines
diplomacy as a strategic tool utilized by the state to implement its national interests,
while displaying its prestige and national character. At the same time, diplomacy defines
the nature of the relationship between given states. It is the most important tool in the
international system that a state possesses, since it allows for the attainment of given
goals without the use of force or other forms of coercive action. Fundamentally,
diplomatic relations between states define the nature and structure of their membership in
a given international organization. Negotiations, cost-benefit assessments, rules,
regulations, set goals, potential objectives, and the overall purpose of the international
organization are all realized through diplomatic efforts.161
In accounting for the new anomalies of modernity, the concept of diplomacy provides
an initial explanation of how these anomalies can be addressed. It accounts for the
formation of these new phenomena, the nature and structure of how they came into being,
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Realism conceptualizes diplomacy within a distinct framework. It understands that diplomacy should
look at the political scene from the point of view of other nations, and that nations should be willing to
compromise on all issues that are not vital to them. Furthermore, a nation should give up the shadow of
worthless rights in favor of the substance of real advantage, but a nation should never put itself in a position
from which it cannot retreat without losing face and cannot advance without great risks. At the same time,
the armed forces of the state must be the instruments of foreign policy and not its master, and that
government should be the leader of public opinion and not its servant. For further discussion of realism’s
conceptualization of diplomacy, see Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace, pp. 381-387.
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and the underlying explanations for their continued existence. By studying the diplomatic
relations between the member states of international organizations, the nature of their
interactions as extensions of their given state’s interests and objectives, and the
formulation of mutual goals, realism provides coherent explanations to the rise of IGOs
in the international political system. At the same time, the study of diplomacy provides a
window into better understanding the reasons why a state joins certain IGOs, or what it
seeks to gain from membership. More concrete assumptions can be developed for
understanding the conditions for cooperation, or the environment that encourages a state
to be cooperative. Policies of member states can be more thoroughly understood through
the study of diplomacy, allowing for a more systematic understanding of state behavior as
a member of a given international organization.
Diplomatic relations are further solidified and made into law through treaties, that is,
alliances. Alliances provide the fundamental structure that legitimizes international
institutions and organizations. Alliances provide explanations to such factors as
continued cooperation, restraint, obligations, and responsible behavior. If diplomacy
accounts as to how international institutions and regional organizations come into being,
the concept of alliance explains how such establishments are maintained. The formation
of alliances are the conclusions to the diplomatic process, and as such, where the latter
ends, the former begins. For this reason, a comprehensive assessment of the new
anomalies of the modern age requires the study of alliance formation. All international
organizations are formed and legitimized through treaties, creating alliances between
member states. Obviously, the nature and structure of certain international institutions
make certain alliances strong and obligatory, while others are quite loose. The European
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Union is an example of the former, while the United Nations of the latter. However, to
account for this very phenomenon, the study of alliances becomes a necessity. The reason
why international institutions and regional intergovernmental organizations have become
relevant in the international scene could be best understood by scrutinizing the scope and
structure of the alliances that have legitimized such institutions.
The rise in international organizations and institutions, the continued integration of
supranational entities, the evolving scope of regionalism, institutional restraint,
ascendancy of international law, extensive cooperation, and the spread of globalization
have become actual phenomena in the state-based international system because states
have nurtured the birth of these anomalies. The circumstance or environment that realism
maintains allowed for such phenomena is the concept of international peace. As an
auxiliary assumption, international peace does not pertain to the complete absence of
conflict in the world, but rather the lack of conflict amongst the powerful states in the
international system. The world has witnessed extensive levels of cooperation between
the world powers in the modern era, specifically between actors that were adversaries
during the Cold War. This extensive cooperation, via diplomacy and alliance formation,
can be accounted for by observing the existence of international peace in the international
system. The power constellations of the new world, however, are quite uncertain and it
would be premature to prescribe predictions without first investigating what the world
powers might expect from their international engagements. This uncertainty rests on the
fact that the unipolar system is perhaps witnessing the decline of the single hegemonic
power, with other potential powers (e.g. China, Russia, Japan, etc.) striving for a multipolar world order. This assumption is further supported by the European component
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(specifically Western Europe), since the American notion of unipolarity finds opposition
against the European vision of pluralism. At the same time, rising powers have found it
beneficial to develop strong relations, economic and political cooperation, and
institutional collaboration with both the hegemon and other rising powers. This
atmosphere classical realism conceptualizes as international peace.
International peace becomes a reality by two primary devices. The first is the balance
of power, and the second is the normative limitations of “international law, international
morality, and world public opinion.”162 Balance of power, however, is not an adequate
device to preserve peace, for its uncertainty, aggravated by the absence of a restraining
moral consensus, leaves balance of power vulnerable as a peace-maintaining device.
International morality, on the other hand, can exert substantial pressure and promote
peace preservation if it could be counter-balanced against the phenomenon of
nationalism. Classical realism suggests a causal relationship between the decline of
international morality and the rise of nationalism; if nationalism witnesses a similar
decline in the face of the changing circumstances of international politics, then the world
may perhaps observe the rejuvenation of international peace.163 In applying this premise
to the current international scene, it becomes quite feasible to argue that the nature of
regionalism, integration, cooperation, and globalization are directly tied to the decline of
nationalism. International or regional cooperation requires a certain degree of openness,
while at the same time restricting chauvinism and ideological irredentism. International
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peace could not have been cultivated in the previous eras because nationalism and
ideological irredentism superceded all notions of openness, cooperation, and restraint. In
the modern age, however, the world has witnessed the exact opposite: in many areas the
decline of nationalism and ideological irredentism has been replaced by an international
sense of cooperation, integration, openness, and even a sense of comradery.164 This, in
turn, has allowed for the rise of the new anomalies in the modern age. Consequently,
realism’s concepts of diplomacy, alliance, and international peace not only account for
these anomalies, but also explain the process through which they came into being and the
mechanism through which they are maintained.
An extension of international peace is the concept of world public opinion, which is a
phenomenon that transcends national boundaries and asserts itself in uniting much of the
world’s reaction to certain political forces. Namely, it is a mechanism of enforcing peace
on the international scene. This concept of a world public opinion allows for a better
understanding of globalization. Globalization, as a phenomenon, is both controversial and
problematic with respect to defining it or specifying its given qualities and criteria.
Whatever the case may be, the fact of the matter is that globalization does exist and it has
come to define the modern age. In this sense, the anomalies of integration, regionalism,
intergovernmental institutions, and extensive cooperation are intertwined with
globalization in a structure of reciprocity. Clearly, globalization became an international
phenomenon because the new anomalies allowed for globalization to become a reality. If
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The exception being certain forces and states in the Middle East, or the Muslim world that advocate
religious extremism as a form of nationalism and ideological irredentism. In such cases, openness,
cooperation, or institutional restraint is either absent or minimal. However, since neither of these actors are
world powers, their effect upon international peace is non-existent. Namely, world powers are either united
against such forces, or display neutrality. But no circumstance can be observed where world powers have
threatened international peace because of such actors.
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international cooperation, integration, international peace, and the formation of
international intergovernmental organizations did not exist, the international structure
would not have allowed for globalization to take place. At the same time, globalization
has strengthened and reinforced the rise of the specified anomalies, and to this end, all
these phenomena are the byproducts of one another. World public opinion has provided
the environment through which globalization has come to dominate the modern age.
There appears to be a uniformity of opinion in the world that encourages continued
economic, political, and social interaction, even integration and growth, which further
promotes globalization. Globalization has provided for a network that ties humanity
together, and world public opinion both encourages and promotes this process.
Concomitantly, this entire process contributes to international peace, which in turn allows
for the growth of cooperation, integration, and institutional restraint via diplomacy and
alliances.
While the concepts of diplomacy, alliance formation, and international peace explain
the new anomalies as outcomes of modernity, the realist fundamental assumption of
interest defined in terms of power provides the most coherent explanation for state
behavior. Realism’s ability to account for the anomalies of the modern international
political system is further supplemented by the paradigm’s capacity to explain the actions
of the given actors that have contributed to the formulation of the anomalies. The rise of
international organizations and institutions, the continued integration of supranational
entities, the evolving scope of regionalism, institutional restraint, extensive interaction,
and cooperation are most concretely defined by the self-interest of the rational actor: the
state. The capacity of given states to expand and preserve their interests has found the
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highest benefit in integration and cooperation. International institutions and organizations
have allowed for a shifting of responsibility, through which states, in comparison, use
fewer resources in dealing with other states in the endeavor of furthering or preserving
their interests. Cooperation and institutional restraint have replaced the much more
difficult processes of brinkmanship, threat, mobilization, and the eventual use of force.
More specifically, force has become a last resort, and one least preferable to the interests
of the state. Policy formulation and implementation for the rational actor has become less
dangerous, since calculating and assessing the positions of opposing actors are made
more coherent by the given rules such actors follow as being members of certain
international or regional intergovernmental institutions. Responsibility and obligation to
preserving the international peace give way to self-restraint, since international peace
allows for the proliferation of the interests of the state. In essence, the power of a given
actor is optimized by precisely knowing the limitations of the opposing actor. In more
simple terms, with minor exceptions, there are a set of rules that everyone plays by, and
for this reason, the degree of security provided by integration, interaction, and
cooperation enhances the powers of the state, that is, the ability to preserve its interests.
These new alliances, therefore, have become forms of power for the given states,
allowing for the coherent formulation and strengthening of their interests.
Fundamentally, however, in instances where the interests of the state have been
limited or restricted by new supranational entities, intergovernmental organizations, or
institutional agreements, such states have either disregarded or simply bypassed these
restraining factors to further their interests. Therefore, states accept the importance of
regional integration, obligations to international institutional, intergovernmental
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cooperation, and adherence to international law only to the extent to which such factors
benefit the given objectives of the state. The new institutional, regional, and cooperative
arrangements of modernity only serve to enhance the powers of the state, for they serve
as supplemental tools in advancing the interests of the state. In instances where such
arrangements harm or minimize the objectives of the state, these arrangements are either
disregarded, ignored, or the state unilaterally withdraws from the organization.
Essentially, the rational state actor engages in a cost-benefit analysis when confronted
with the alliance or treaty obligations it has as a member of an intergovernmental
institution. Accordingly, cooperation, integration, and openness are all limited, for the
very notion of membership is based on the benefits that could be accrued by the given
state.
In sum, the atmosphere of cooperation, interaction, and dialogue has promoted peace
and well being in the international system. These new phenomena of the modern age
have contributed to the advancement of the powers of the state, for they have allowed for
the preservation or the extension of the state’s interests. Fundamentally, regionalism,
integration, institutional membership, cooperation, and interaction benefit the interests of
given states. When the opposite happens to be the case, states either disregard their
commitments, or completely withdraw from such arrangements. Whatever the case may
be, the interests of the state remain paramount.

Conclusion
A paradigm is only as powerful and useful as its ability to demonstrate its structural
coherency and explanatory powers, while ruling out plausible competing assumptions
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and explanations of the international political system. This thesis demonstrated the
structural and philosophical coherency, theoretical and epistemological consistency, and
the scientifically-oriented progressiveness of classical realism. Furthermore, the paradigm
displayed its staying power by exhibiting powerful auxiliary assumptions, showing the
paradigm’s scope and depth in accounting for new anomalies in the modern international
system. Realism’s staying power, as a potent tool in the study of international relations, is
one reason why it remains a dominant paradigm.
The case has been made as to why classical realism must be revived. Whereas most
paradigms are ephemeral—in that they come into being either as reactions to an existing
school of thought or an in an attempt to address new anomalies—realism has displayed a
staying power in addressing phenomena and anomalies throughout the course of human
history. In its contemporary form, the field of international relations presents several
alternative paradigms or methodological approaches to the realist approach. The fact that
none have supplanted realism as the dominant paradigm speaks volumes for its salience.
The neorealist paradigm, and its minimalist offspring, present one alternative; neoliberal
institutionalism represents another; the critical theory approach (Marxist, NeoGramscian, etc.) yet another; world-systems theory presents the fourth alternative; the
liberal paradigm provides the fifth alternative; while the epistemic, or the postpositivist
approach, represents the sixth alternative.
Chapter 3 demonstrated the failure of the neorealist approach through its revisionism
and internal contradictions. Its structural approach was deemed to be an insufficient and
deterministic account of international phenomena, while its anti-reductionist approach
made neorealism myopic and limited. The limits of neorealism have been further
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recognized by a new generation of “realist” scholars, where the paradigm has been
fragmented into an endless number of approaches.165 Neorealism’s structural approach
was applicable, in a limited capacity, to the bipolar system of the Cold War, but has been
insufficient in addressing the post-Cold War structure. This is the reason why various
offshoots of the paradigms have been born to account for the anomalies that structuralism
cannot. For this reason, neorealism can be deemed as an ephemeral paradigm.
The institutionalist approach was also addressed in Chapter 3, assessing the role of
international institutions, norms, revisionist realist propositions, and hegemonic
assumptions that the paradigm holds. While the fundamental assumptions that
institutionalism makes about the world are underdeveloped, its assessment of institutions
has been valuable to international relations scholarship. But a paradigm based on the
study of institutionalism is by definition both a limited paradigm, and an ephemeral one.
Namely, if through the restructuration of the international system institutions become
marginal or irrelevant, paradigmatic institutionalist assumptions will become
degenerative and inapplicable.
The third alternative, the critical theory approach, is the constellation of various
paradigmatic methodological forms of analysis, ranging from Marxist analysis, to NeoGramscian theories, to general critiques of Western capitalism and the institutions that
promote its proliferation. Critical theory is a singular approach, and as such, it is difficult
to compare an issue-oriented approach (third-world exploitation, cultural hegemony,
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The paradigm has been splintered into the following fragments: defensive realism, offensive realism,
neoclassical realism, and minimalist realism (balance-of-threat realists, wilful realism, legalist realism,
institutionalist realism, contingent realism). See Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody
Still a Realist?,” International Security Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), pp. 5-55. See also Sten Rynning and
Jens Ringsmose, “Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist? Reviving Classical Realism as an Approach to
Understanding International Change,” International Politics, Vol. 45 (2008), pp 19-39.
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Western dominance, etc.) to an entire paradigm. This thesis concedes that not only is
critical theory highly valuable, but it also is not ephemeral, and for these reasons, serves
an important purpose in the study of international relations. However, as an approach that
encompasses scope and depth, critical theory is far too insufficient in comparison to
classical realism. That is, while critical theory is a singular analytical approach, classical
realism is a multi-theoretical paradigm.
The fourth alternative, world-systems theory, is a paradigmatic approach to
addressing world-empires and world-economies as the two main forms of world systems
through a structural systemic framework. World-systems theory primarily argues that the
only existing world system in the modern international political system is the capitalist
world-economy. Its analytical approach fuses structuralism with historicism to account
for the development and dominance of the world capitalist system. This is further
supplemented by the implementation of three structural positions in a world economy:
core states (dominant in production, control over world economy, and exploiter of the
lower strata); semi periphery states (serve the interests of the core, acting as exploiters of
the periphery-states, but also being exploited by the core states); and periphery-states
(provide the raw resources and materials necessary for the continued dominance of the
core states, while being heavily dependent upon the two upper strata). World-systems
theory attempts to structurally account for the continued exploitation of the periphery and
semi-periphery by the core, with the semi-periphery serving as the destabilizing agent
that allows the upper strata to deprive the lower strata from developing the capacity to
potentially challenge the core states.166 World-systems theory is not only unique and non-
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For a look at world-systems theory, see Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World system I: Capitalist
Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, (New York:
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ephemeral, but it provides for a use of structural analysis that is both historic and
dynamic, unlike the ahistoricism of neorealism. Its explanatory powers addresses historic
processes, development of world-systems within given historic epochs, and the structural
interactions of agents in the international political system. The analytical and theoretical
scope of this paradigm, however, is limited in comparison to classical realism. Relying on
third-level imagery, it cannot account for second or first level imagery analysis, while
realism accounts for all three levels. Its systemic approach limits states to given strata or
position, failing to account for inter-state conflict, and only accounting for inter-strata
conflict. In contrast, realism addresses inter-state conflict through second-imagery
analysis, while dealing with structural assessments through the balance of power theory.
Finally, world-systems theory reduces all forms of analysis to an economic genesis,
which limits its capacity to account for factors broader than the economic structure. In
sum, world-systems theory has been quite limited in modern scholarship, while realism
remains a central paradigm. However, a revival of world-systems theory could be highly
beneficial to the study of international relations, since it allows for a distinct analytical
approach that is both historical and non-static.
The fifth alternative, the liberal paradigm, proposes theories and explanations that
stress the value of exogenous variations in basic state preferences that are embedded in
domestic and transnational relations (such relations tend to be state-societal).

Academic Press, 1974); see also, The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the
European World Economy 1600-1750, (New York: Academic Press, 1980); and “A World-System
Perspective on the Social Sciences,” The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 27, No. 3 (September, 1976),
pp. 343-352; for discussion of post-cold war system, see “The World-System after the Cold War,” Journal
of Peace Research, Vol. 30, No. 1, (February, 2005), pp. 1-6. For criticism of world-systems theory, see
Theda Skocpol, “Wallerstein’s World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique,” American
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No. 5 (1977), pp. 1083-1085. See also, Robert Brenner, “The Origins of
Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism,” New Left Review, Vol. 104 (1977), pp. 25-
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Paradigmatic liberal theoretical and conceptual models are primarily second-image, or
second level analysis, concentrating on propositions about the autonomous impact of
economic interdependence, domestic institutions and their effects, and socially oriented
assessments such as the provision of public goods, ethnic identity, regulatory protection,
socioeconomic redistribution, and political regime type.167 While the liberal paradigm
cannot be deemed ephemeral, for it has existed as the heir to idealism, it is nonetheless
subordinate to classical realism, since both paradigms have existed in international
relations scholarship for the same amount of time, but the role of realism has been far
more central. Furthermore, second-imagery analysis places liberalism at a disadvantage
when compared to the explanatory powers of classical realism, for realism addresses all
three levels of imagery analysis. While liberalism simply cannot be discarded as a
paradigm, it nevertheless serves a subordinate role when compared to the theoretical
depth, philosophical structure, and explanatory powers of realism.
The sixth alternative, the epistemic approach, contains theories and explanations
concerning the causal role of collective beliefs and ideas as contributing variables in
assessing how states calculate their underlying goals and objectives. The epistemic
approach stresses exogenous variation in the shared beliefs that structure affect
perceptions of the given environment. The epistemic research programs apply extensive
attention to the strategic, organizational, economic, and industrial components of culture,
the formulation of belief systems that produce epistemic communities, the social

92. Also, Stanley Aronowitz, “A Metatheoretical Critique of Immanuel Wallerstein’s The Modern World
System,” Theory and Society, Vol. 10, No. 4 (July, 1981), pp. 503-520.
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See Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 80,
No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169. See also, Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A
liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp.
513-553.
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structuration of ideas and identities, and the anti-essentialist foundations of its
epistemological approach.168 The most prominent epistemic approach is constructivism,
which holds many of the same postpostivist assumptions regarding the anti-essentialist
premise that human association is determined primarily through shared ideas rather than
material forces. The constructivist method of critique is deconstructivist, and to this end,
its fundamental approach is epistemological. The fundamental claim of constructivism is
that social structures constitute the construction of agents, while social structure, itself, is
constituted by shared beliefs. In short, constructivism is about human consciousness and
its ideational role in the international system. Its ontology, therefore, is idealistic and
holistic.169 Because constructivism is an epistemological method of analysis, it lacks the
structuration and theoretical framework to be deemed a paradigm.170 Adapted from social
psychology and pedagogy, it is a postpostivist method of inquiry that questions the
givenness, or the essence, of the presumed world. In this sense, constructivism, or any of
the epistemic approaches, may be applied to any of the international relations paradigms,
since they hold no core concepts, fundamental assumptions, or auxiliary hypotheses.
Constructivists, therefore, accept the realist notions of anarchy, power and interest, and
consider the state to be the unit of analysis. However, their assessment of these concepts
vastly differs from realism, since the two have completely different epistemologies. In
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See Peter Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3
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International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1987), pp. 61-92.
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this sense, realism presents a theory of international relations, while constructivism
presents a model of inquiry.
The study of international relations is a study of the political forces that dominate and
define the given world. International relations is comprehensive and exhaustive, for it
aspires to scientifically explain and predict behavior on the international scene. The study
of international relations, therefore, is not merely a study of specific issues, actors, or
outcomes, but an extensive and collective study of all these factors. By virtue of its
specific areas of concentration, certain paradigms formulate concepts, assumptions, or
propositions that better address such specific realms of inquiry. But such paradigms are
limited and ephemeral. A robust paradigm must possess the necessary tools to address the
international system in its entirety, and not in piecemeal. Whereas certain paradigms base
the structuration of their theories upon other paradigms, or rely on other disciplines to
provide analytical or methodological tools to account for the international political
system, a powerful paradigm does all this independently through its own theoretical and
philosophical model. Whereas certain paradigms are degenerative and rely on ad hoc and
contradictory auxiliaries, a progressive paradigm relies on its articulated concepts and
refined auxiliaries to account for anomalies. A paradigm reigns dominant if it possesses
the depth and scope necessary to account for the enormity that is the international
political system. In the field of international relations, classical realism reigns supreme.

Challenge,” International Organization Vol. 52, No. 4, International Organizations at Fifty: Exploration
and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, (Autumn 1998), pp. 855-885.
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